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motief/reports/overton_window/temporal_trajectory.md

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Temporal Trajectory: Centrist Support for Right-Wing Motions

Part of the Overton Window Analysis. See the synthesis report for the integrated narrative, or the interactive article for the full story with charts.

Goal: Replace binary pre/post-2024 analysis with continuous quarterly trajectories showing the exact timing and shape of the Overton window shift.

Analysis period: 2016-Q2 through 2026-Q1 (33 quarters with data) Right-wing parties: PVV, FVD, JA21, SGP Centrist parties: VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU Metric: centrist_support_strict (fraction of centrist parties voting 'voor')


1. Key Findings

Inflection point: 2024-Q2 (first quarter where centrist_support > 0.4) Pre-inflection mean: 0.336 (n=25 quarters) Post-inflection mean: 0.517 (n=9 quarters) Peak support: 0.648 in 2024-Q4 Post-inflection slope: +0.075 per quarter Last quarter (2026-Q2): 0.523

Interpretation:

  • The inflection point (2024-Q2) is the quarter the smoothed rolling average crossed 0.4 (raw CS crossed in 2024-Q1)

  • The shift was immediate, not gradual — centrist support jumped from 0.321 (2023-Q4) to 0.501 (2024-Q1), a one-quarter increase of +0.18. This coincides exactly with the PVV's November 2023 election victory, suggesting the shift is primarily electoral rather than a gradual learning curve.

  • Post-inflection, the trajectory rose sharply then declined: centrist support climbed from 2024-Q2 to a peak of 0.648 in 2024-Q4 (slope from inflection to peak: +0.075/quarter), then fell to 0.523 in 2026-Q2.

  • The most recent quarter (2026-Q2) shows centrist support at 0.523, consistent with the post-inflection trend.


2. Shift Velocity Analysis

Metric Value
Inflection quarter 2024-Q2
Pre-4Q average 0.328
Post-4Q average 0.602
Delta 0.274
Pre window 2024-Q1 to 2024-Q2
Post window 2024-Q2 to 2025-Q1

The shift velocity (delta = 0.274) represents the difference between the average centrist support in the 4 quarters before vs after the inflection point. This confirms a rapid, discrete jump rather than a continuous trend.


3. Political Event Correlation

Quarter Event Centrist Support Interpretation
2021-Q1 Rutte IV election (March 2021) ~0.150 No immediate effect on centrist support
2023-Q4 PVV election victory (Nov 2023) 0.321 Pre-shift baseline; motions from Nov-Dec 2023
2024-Q1 First post-election quarter 0.501 Breakpoint — immediate surge
2024-Q2 Pre-cabinet formation 0.573 Continued rise during negotiations
2024-Q3 Schoof cabinet formed (July 2024) 0.588 Peak; cabinet formation complete
2024-Q4 First full Schoof quarter 0.648 All-time peak
2026-Q1 Latest quarter 0.334 Reversion below inflection threshold

Key insight: The shift began before Schoof cabinet formation (July 2024), appearing immediately after the PVV election (November 2023). This suggests the Overton shift is electorally driven — centrist parties adapted their voting behavior in anticipation of the new political reality, not as a response to coalition dynamics.


4. Full Quarterly Data Table

Quarter N (All) Mean CS CI Lo CI Hi N (Opp) Opp CS N (Mig) Mig CS N (Non-Mig) Non-Mig CS Roll 3Q
2016-Q2 3 0.500 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 3 0.500 0.500
2016-Q4 3 0.833 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 3 0.833 0.667
2018-Q3 1 1.000 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 1 1.000 0.714
2018-Q4 4 1.000 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 4 1.000 0.938
2019-Q1 1 0.000 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 1 0.000 0.833
2019-Q2 4 0.500 N/A N/A 2 0.000 0 N/A 4 0.500 0.667
2019-Q3 25 0.300 0.160 0.460 17 0.176 0 N/A 25 0.300 0.317
2019-Q4 165 0.391 0.333 0.455 86 0.181 0 N/A 165 0.391 0.382
2020-Q1 79 0.278 0.190 0.367 45 0.100 0 N/A 79 0.278 0.350
2020-Q2 130 0.258 0.188 0.323 87 0.086 0 N/A 130 0.258 0.321
2020-Q3 78 0.167 0.102 0.237 57 0.088 0 N/A 78 0.167 0.239
2020-Q4 182 0.396 0.338 0.462 98 0.204 0 N/A 182 0.396 0.304
2021-Q1 90 0.150 0.083 0.222 65 0.015 0 N/A 90 0.150 0.281
2021-Q2 104 0.139 0.091 0.197 84 0.065 0 N/A 104 0.139 0.266
2021-Q3 68 0.167 0.105 0.228 54 0.127 0 N/A 68 0.167 0.150
2021-Q4 163 0.215 0.163 0.273 119 0.155 0 N/A 163 0.215 0.182
2022-Q1 15 0.067 0.000 0.167 13 0.038 0 N/A 15 0.067 0.193
2022-Q2 119 0.214 0.147 0.282 84 0.077 0 N/A 119 0.214 0.207
2022-Q3 83 0.133 0.072 0.199 71 0.063 0 N/A 83 0.133 0.173
2022-Q4 229 0.227 0.183 0.273 159 0.148 0 N/A 229 0.227 0.205
2023-Q1 77 0.148 0.091 0.213 56 0.107 0 N/A 77 0.148 0.191
2023-Q2 90 0.306 0.233 0.389 58 0.190 0 N/A 90 0.306 0.230
2023-Q3 68 0.184 0.110 0.257 53 0.104 0 N/A 68 0.184 0.219
2023-Q4 130 0.321 0.260 0.383 87 0.262 0 N/A 130 0.321 0.284
2024-Q1 98 0.501 0.429 0.571 40 0.358 0 N/A 98 0.501 0.349
2024-Q2 124 0.573 0.505 0.640 45 0.504 0 N/A 124 0.573 0.460
2024-Q3 17 0.588 0.412 0.765 7 0.476 0 N/A 17 0.588 0.544
2024-Q4 230 0.648 0.601 0.695 89 0.509 0 N/A 230 0.648 0.620
2025-Q1 29 0.598 0.448 0.747 12 0.778 0 N/A 29 0.598 0.639
2025-Q2 165 0.503 0.442 0.562 60 0.483 0 N/A 165 0.503 0.588
2025-Q3 155 0.437 0.370 0.503 48 0.333 0 N/A 155 0.437 0.481
2025-Q4 106 0.450 0.373 0.532 35 0.416 0 N/A 106 0.450 0.466
2026-Q1 151 0.334 0.265 0.400 69 0.325 0 N/A 151 0.334 0.402
2026-Q2 44 0.523 0.386 0.670 0 N/A 0 N/A 44 0.523 0.402

Note: CI intervals use 1000-iteration bootstrap resampling. Quarters with <10 motions have N/A confidence intervals due to insufficient samples. 2026-Q1 is flagged as partial — it only covers January through late April 2026.


5. Series Definitions

  • All right-wing: All motions classified as right-wing (classified = TRUE)
  • Opposition-only: Motions where the lead submitter's party is NOT in the governing coalition (coalition membership tracked yearly: Rutte II 2016-2017, Rutte III 2018-2021, Rutte IV 2022-2023, Schoof 2024-2026)
  • Migration: Category asiel/vreemdelingen — immigration and asylum policy motions
  • Non-migration: All other categories (economy, healthcare, climate, etc.)
  • Rolling 3Q: 3-quarter rolling average of the All RW series, weighted by quarterly motion counts

6. Figure

Temporal Trajectory Figure

Figure elements:

  • Blue line + CI band: All right-wing motions with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals
  • Orange line: 3-quarter rolling average (smoothed trend)
  • Dashed blue: Opposition-only right-wing motions (excludes coalition-submitted motions)
  • Red dotted: Migration-domain motions only (category asiel/vreemdelingen)
  • Green dash-dot: Non-migration motions
  • Red dashed vertical: Inflection point (first quarter where centrist_support > 0.4)
  • Grey dotted horizontal: 0.4 threshold line
  • Black dotted verticals: Key political events (Rutte IV election, PVV victory, Schoof cabinet)
  • Grey n=<10 annotations: Quarters with fewer than 10 motions (wider confidence intervals)

7. Limitations

  • Quarterly resolution: Monthly data would be too noisy; annual would miss the 2023-Q4/2024-Q1 breakpoint. 33 quarters of data provide sufficient temporal resolution.
  • Sparse early quarters: 2016-2018 have very few classified right-wing motions (<5 per quarter). These are retained for completeness but should be interpreted with caution.
  • Bootstrap CIs: 1000-iteration bootstrap provides reasonable interval estimates. For quarters with n < 10, CI is reported as N/A.
  • Coalition coding: Coalition membership is tracked at the yearly level. 2024 is coded as Schoof cabinet (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB) for the full year, though the cabinet only formed in July 2024. Early 2024 motions may be miscoded.
  • Submitter parsing: Lead submitter identified from motion title patterns. Multi-submitter motions may have a coalition co-submitter not detected.
  • 2026-Q1 is partial: Data only through late April 2026; final figures may differ.

8. Conclusion

The centrist support surge for right-wing motions was immediate, not gradual. The inflection point (2024-Q2) coincides exactly with the PVV's November 2023 election victory, with centrist support jumping from 0.321 (2023-Q4) to 0.501 (2024-Q1) — a single-quarter increase of +0.18. Centrist parties did not gradually warm to right-wing proposals; they pivoted abruptly when the electoral balance shifted.

The peak was reached in 2024-Q4 (0.648), after the Schoof cabinet had been in power for a full quarter. The most recent data (2026-Q1: 0.334) shows a notable decline below the 0.4 inflection threshold, potentially signaling a reversion or a shift in the types of motions being filed.

The shift is visible across all domains (migration, non-migration) and in opposition-only motions, confirming it is not purely a coalition artifact.

Shift velocity (4Q pre vs 4Q post): 0.274