feat(analysis): Overton window breakpoint analysis with opposition control and SVD drift
Quantify 2024 breakpoint in centrist support (d=+0.68 overall, d=+0.85 opposition-only), domain decomposition, extremity-stratified pass rates, and manual LLM audit (75% agreement). SVD center drift aborted due to axis instability (9/10 consecutive window pairs fail stability threshold).
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# Overton Window Breakpoint Analysis
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**Goal:** Quantify the 2024 structural break in centrist support, pass rates,
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and content extremity for right-wing motions in the Tweede Kamer.
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**Analysis period:** 2016–2026
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**Right-wing parties:** PVV, FVD, JA21, SGP
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**Centrist parties:** VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU
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**Left parties:** PvdA, GL, SP, PvdD, Volt, DENK, Bij1
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---
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## 1. Yearly Aggregate Metrics (All Right-Wing Motions)
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| Year | N (RW) | Centrist Support | Pass Rate | Extremity | Right Support | Left Opp. |
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|------|--------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|----------|
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| 2016 | 6 | 0.722 | 1.000 | 2.00 | 1.000 | 0.708 |
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| 2017 | 0 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
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| 2018 | 5 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.40 | 0.800 | 0.480 |
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| 2019 | 195 | 0.410 | 0.969 | 2.14 | 0.838 | 0.746 |
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| 2020 | 469 | 0.326 | 0.979 | 2.26 | 0.818 | 0.758 |
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| 2021 | 425 | 0.339 | 0.962 | 2.24 | 0.903 | 0.788 |
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| 2022 | 446 | 0.404 | 0.926 | 2.16 | 0.891 | 0.820 |
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| 2023 | 365 | 0.457 | 0.962 | 2.24 | 0.900 | 0.821 |
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| 2024 | 469 | 0.670 | 1.000 | 1.99 | 0.885 | 0.756 |
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| 2025 | 455 | 0.597 | 0.996 | 2.25 | 0.895 | 0.799 |
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| 2026 | 151 | 0.518 | 0.927 | 2.33 | 0.916 | 0.834 |
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## 2. Pre/Post 2024 Comparison
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**Break year:** 2024
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### All right-wing motions
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| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen's d |
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|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|-----------|
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| Centrist Support | 0.384 | 0.618 | +0.234 | +0.68 |
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| Pass Rate | 0.959 | 0.988 | +0.029 | +0.18 |
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| Extremity | 2.21 | 2.15 | -0.07 | -0.09 |
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**Interpretation:** Cohen's d values quantify effect sizes (|d| < 0.2 small, 0.5 medium, > 0.8 large).
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These are descriptive, not inferential — with only 8 pre-2024 years and 3 post-2024 years, statistical significance is not claimed.
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### Opposition-only right-wing motions
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| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen's d | N pre / N post |
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|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|-----------|---------------|
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| Centrist Support | 0.270 | 0.543 | +0.272 | +0.85 | 1295 / 405 |
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| Pass Rate | 0.954 | 0.985 | +0.031 | +0.18 | 1295 / 405 |
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| Extremity | 2.28 | 2.18 | -0.10 | -0.14 | 1295 / 405 |
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**Interpretation gate:** If opposition metrics also rise post-2024, the shift is not
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purely coalition-driven. If opposition metrics stay flat while overall metrics rise,
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the shift is coalition-specific.
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## 3. Coalition Composition
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2016-2017: Rutte II (VVD/PvdA). 2018-2021: Rutte III (VVD/CDA/D66/CU). 2022-2023: Rutte IV (VVD/D66/CDA/CU). 2024-2026: Schoof (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB). 2024 ambiguous: Schoof cabinet started July 2024; all 2024 motions are coded to the Schoof coalition. Coalition effect may be overestimated for early 2024.
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Submitter party is parsed from motion title prefixes
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(e.g., "Motie van het lid Wilders over ..."). Only the lead submitter's party is
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considered. Multi-submitter motions may have a coalition member as co-submitter
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but still be counted as opposition if the lead submitter is not in the coalition.
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## 4. Domain Decomposition
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Migration = category `asiel/vreemdelingen`. Non-migration = all other categories.
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| Domain | Pre-2024 Mean CS | Post-2024 Mean CS | Δ CS | Pre-2024 PR | Post-2024 PR | Δ PR |
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|--------|-----------------|------------------|------|-------------|-------------|------|
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| Migration | 0.303 | 0.536 | +0.233 | 0.981 | 0.975 | -0.006 |
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| Non-migration | 0.529 | 0.605 | +0.076 | 0.969 | 0.974 | +0.005 |
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## 5. Extremity-Stratified Pass Rate
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| Bucket | Period | N | Pass Rate | Δ (post-pre) |
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|--------|--------|---|-----------|-------------|
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| 1-2 (mild) | Pre-2024 | 221 | 0.950 | |
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| | Post-2024 | 181 | 1.000 | +0.050 |
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| 2-3 (moderate) | Pre-2024 | 1205 | 0.949 | |
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| | Post-2024 | 640 | 0.983 | +0.033 |
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| 3-4 (high) | Pre-2024 | 352 | 0.983 | |
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| | Post-2024 | 175 | 0.994 | +0.011 |
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| 4-5 (extreme) | Pre-2024 | 133 | 0.992 | |
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| | Post-2024 | 79 | 0.987 | -0.005 |
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**Key test:** If high-extremity motions (3–5) went from low pass rate to high pass rate
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while mild motions stayed flat, centrists are more tolerant of extreme content —
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direct Overton shift evidence. If pass rate rose uniformly across all buckets, the
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shift is about quantity, not tolerance. If only the 1–2 bucket rose, right-wing
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parties filed milder motions post-2024 and the 'shift' is illusory.
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## 6. Manual Extremity Audit
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**Agreement rate: 15/20 (75%)** — above the 70% threshold; LLM scores not flagged as unreliable, but borderline.
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**Identified systematic biases:**
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- **Anti-institutional overrating:** LLM inflates scores on anti-EU, anti-government motions (e.g., "opzeggen vertrouwen in kabinet" scored 3, should be 2; "niet meegaan in EU politieke unie" scored 4, should be 2-3). Procedural or stance-taking motions scored as radical policy.
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- **Migration/cultural adjacency inflation:** Motions mentioning migration, Syrians, vaccination score higher than warranted (e.g., "vrijwillige terugkeer Syriërs" scored 4, should be 2; "vrijwillige vaccinatie" scored 2, should be 1; "racistisch allochtoon geweld" scored 4 with inflammatory language but somewhat justified by "alle noodzakelijke middelen").
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- **Climate topic inflation:** Technical environmental motions scored higher than warranted (e.g., "emissiegegevens beter afbakenen" scored 3, should be 2).
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**Language-vs-impact divergence:** Present in ~5 of 20 motions (25%), most pronounced in the 3-4 and 4-5 buckets. LLM is influenced by topic salience and keyword-level signals more than by the substantive policy mechanism described.
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| # | Year | Category | LLM Score | Bucket | Agreed? | Driver | Notes |
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|---|------|----------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|-------|
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| 1 | 2024 | economie/belasting | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | Y | Policy | EU directive implementation; routine |
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| 2 | 2020 | economie/belasting | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | Y | Policy | Symbolic support for KLM; mild |
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| 3 | 2019 | veiligheid/justitie | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | Y | Policy | Budget procedural; trivial |
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| 4 | 2025 | economie/belasting | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | Y | Policy | Tax bracket indexing; routine |
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| 5 | 2022 | sociaal/jeugd | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | Y | Policy | One-time parent benefit; limited scope |
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| 6 | 2021 | corona/pandemie | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | Y | Policy | Sport venue regulation; moderate |
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| 7 | 2021 | zorg/gezondheid | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | N (→1) | Language | Voluntary vaccination for at-risk; COVID rhetoric inflates |
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| 8 | 2020 | economie/belasting | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | Y | Policy | Government influence on port; moderate |
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| 9 | 2025 | veiligheid/justitie | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | Y | Both | Police oath reform; symbolic + mild policy |
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| 10 | 2020 | economie/belasting | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | Y | Policy | Corporate tax carryback; narrow fiscal |
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| 11 | 2020 | veiligheid/justitie | 3 | 3-4 (high) | N (→2) | Language | Motion of no-confidence is parliamentary procedure, not radical policy |
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| 12 | 2025 | klimaat/milieu | 3 | 3-4 (high) | N (→2) | Policy | Emission data scoping; narrow technical fix, inflated by climate topic |
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| 13 | 2019 | asiel/vreemdelingen | 3 | 3-4 (high) | Y | Policy | Withdraw from UN Refugee Pact; substantive |
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| 14 | 2019 | landbouw/stikstof | 3 | 3-4 (high) | Y | Policy | Substantially relax nitrogen rules; high environmental impact |
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| 15 | 2020 | klimaat/milieu | 3 | 3-4 (high) | Y | Both | Wolf culling permits; inflammatory topic but permit-framework |
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| 16 | 2020 | veiligheid/justitie | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | Y | Both | "Street terrorists" + denaturalization; both inflammatory and materially extreme |
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| 17 | 2021 | defensie/buitenland | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | N (→2-3) | Language | Standard Eurosceptic position; "niet meegaan in verdere integratie" is moderate |
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| 18 | 2023 | asiel/vreemdelingen | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | Y | Policy | Asylum stop; radical policy against international obligations |
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| 19 | 2025 | asiel/vreemdelingen | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | N (→2) | Language | *Voluntary* return of Syrians is moderate policy; migration topic inflates |
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| 20 | 2019 | sociaal/jeugd | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | Y | Both | "All necessary means against racist immigrant violence"; inflammatory + broad powers
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## 7. Limitations
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- **Small-N time series:** 8 pre-2024 years and at most 3 post-2024 years (2026 is partial).
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Effect sizes are descriptive, not confirmatory.
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- **LLM extremity scores:** Content-based, not independently validated beyond the
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manual audit above. See §6 for agreement rate and noted biases.
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- **Coalition composition:** Hardcoded per year. 2024 is ambiguous (Rutte IV until July,
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Schoof thereafter). Early 2024 motions may be miscoded as Schoof-era.
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- **Submitter party identification:** Parsed from motion title prefixes (e.g.,
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'Motie van het lid X'). May be inaccurate for multi-submitter motions or
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complex title formats.
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- **Keyword penetration not analyzed:** The right-wing keyword set was derived
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differentially from right-wing motions, making it circular for adoption analysis.
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- **Pass rate baseline:** Computed across all motions with voting data. Motions with
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unanimous consent (no recorded vote) are excluded, potentially biasing baseline upward.
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## 8. Figures
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## 9. Conclusion
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### Core finding: Centrist support for right-wing motions surged post-2024 (d=+0.68), and the effect persists — even strengthens — for opposition-only motions (d=+0.85). This is consistent with an Overton window shift: centrist parties are more willing to support right-wing content than before, and the effect is not explained by coalition membership.
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### However, three important qualifications temper a strong Overton-shift interpretation:
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1. **Content extremity did not increase** (d=-0.09). The shift is about acceptance of existing proposals, not increasingly radical proposals. The window has widened — what was once considered beyond the pale is now supportable — but the proposed content hasn't become more extreme.
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2. **Pass rate is near ceiling** (96%+ in all periods). In the Dutch parliament, nearly all motions pass regardless of content or political alignment. Pass rate is insensitive as a shift indicator. The extremity-stratified pass rate test is underpowered for this reason.
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3. **LLM extremity scores are imperfect** (75% audit agreement; borderline). The LLM overrates anti-institutional language and migration-adjacent topics, conflating "inflammatory phrasing" with "material policy impact." This means our content extremity measure is noisy — it captures a mix of stylistic and substantive radicalism.
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### The migration-centric pattern
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The shift is concentrated in migration (centrist support Δ=+0.233) with non-migration showing a much smaller effect (Δ=+0.076). Combined with the fact that migration motions have the highest average extremity (2.80) and are the only consistently negative-sentiment category, this domain is clearly the primary vehicle for the observed shift.
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# Overton Window Shift in the Dutch Parliament: Findings Report
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**Date:** 2026-05-08
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**Branch:** feat/right-wing-motion-analysis
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**Analysis period:** 2016–2026
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---
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## 1. Summary
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We tested the hypothesis that the Overton window shifted rightward in the Tweede Kamer using three indicators: centrist support for right-wing motions, content extremity trends, and SVD spatial drift. **The strongest evidence is for centrist acceptance: support for right-wing motions surged post-2024 (d=+0.68), and the effect is even larger for opposition-only motions (d=+0.85) — ruling out a pure coalition explanation.** However, content extremity did not increase (d=-0.09), and SVD axes proved too unstable for cross-window comparison. The shift is centered on the migration domain.
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---
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## 2. Indicator 1: Centrist Support Breakpoint
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### Core finding
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Centrist support for right-wing motions rose from a pre-2024 mean of 0.384 to a post-2024 mean of 0.618 — a Cohen's d of +0.68 (medium-large effect). This is not a coalition artifact: opposition-only right-wing motions show an even larger increase, from 0.270 to 0.543 (d=+0.85, large effect).
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### Pass rate is an insensitive measure
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Pass rates are near ceiling in all periods (96%+). In the Dutch parliament, nearly all motions pass regardless of content or political alignment. The plan's motivating concern about pass rate shifts (33% → 70%) was based on a different operationalization than what the data supports. With 96%+ passage rates, pass rate cannot serve as a shift indicator.
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### Domain decomposition
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The shift is heavily migration-centric:
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| Domain | Pre-2024 CS | Post-2024 CS | Δ |
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|--------|------------|-------------|---|
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| Migration | 0.303 | 0.536 | +0.233 |
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| Non-migration | 0.529 | 0.605 | +0.076 |
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Migration is the primary vehicle for the observed shift. Non-migration right-wing motions already had moderate centrist support pre-2024, limiting room for growth.
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### Extremity-stratified tolerance test: Inconclusive
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We tested whether centrists became more tolerant of *high-extremity* content specifically by bucketing motions by extremity score (1-2 mild, 2-3 moderate, 3-4 high, 4-5 extreme) and comparing pre/post pass rates. **The test is underpowered**: all buckets show 95-100% pass rates in both periods. With ceiling-level pass rates, there is no room to detect differential tolerance shifts.
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---
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## 3. Indicator 2: Content Extremity Trend
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### Core finding
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Content extremity of right-wing motions **did not increase** (pre-2024: 2.21, post-2024: 2.15, d=-0.09). The Overton window shift is about *acceptance* of existing content — motions that were once beyond the pale are now supportable — not about increasingly radical proposals.
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### LLM scoring reliability
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A stratified manual audit of 20 motions (5 per extremity bucket) achieved **75% agreement** (15/20), above the 70% threshold but borderline. Identified biases:
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- **Anti-institutional overrating:** LLM inflates scores on anti-EU and anti-government motions (procedural stances scored as radical policy)
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- **Migration/cultural adjacency inflation:** Motions mentioning migration-adjacent topics score higher than warranted
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- **Climate topic inflation:** Technical environmental motions scored higher than warranted
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The LLM conflates *stylistic extremity* (inflammatory keywords, charged topics) with *material impact* (substantive rights restrictions, institutional change). This affects ~25% of scored motions, most pronounced in the high and extreme buckets.
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**Implication:** Our content extremity measure is noisy. It captures a mix of stylistic and substantive radicalism. This is a known limitation documented in the plan's deferred follow-up work (two-dimensional scoring validation).
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---
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## 4. Indicator 3: SVD Spatial Drift — INCONCLUSIVE
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### Stability gate: FAILED
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SVD axes were validated for stability across annual windows using Spearman rank correlation of party positions. **9 of 10 consecutive window pairs failed** the ρ ≥ 0.7 threshold (maximum allowed: 2). Mean axis-1 correlation: ρ=0.0054; mean axis-2 correlation: ρ=0.2128.
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This is the expected behavior of per-window SVD: principal axes are determined independently each year and have no inherent longitudinal alignment. Positions may reflect axis re-orientation rather than genuine ideological drift.
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**We cannot draw conclusions about spatial drift from SVD first-two-dimensions data.** See the stability report for per-pair details.
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### Path forward
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The explorer UI uses Procrustes-aligned PCA positions (`load_party_scores_all_windows_aligned` in `analysis/explorer_data.py`) which provide a common reference frame for cross-window comparison. A revised U3 could use this approach. However, we recommend against re-running U3 — the two strong indicators (centrist support surge, no extremity increase) already provide a clear picture, and adding spatial evidence would not change the qualitative conclusion.
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---
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## 5. Synthesis
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### What we can say with confidence
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1. **Centrist parties are more willing to support right-wing motions** post-2024 than before, and this is not explained by coalition membership. Cohen's d = +0.85 for opposition-only motions represents a large effect.
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2. **The shift is migration-centric.** Migration motions saw +0.233 centrist support gain; non-migration saw only +0.076. Migration is also the highest-extremity category and the only consistently negative-sentiment category.
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3. **Content extremity did not increase.** The window widened — what is acceptable grew — but the content of proposed motions is not more radical than before.
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### What we cannot say
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1. **We cannot claim spatial (SVD) drift.** Axes are too unstable for cross-window comparison.
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2. **We cannot quantify how much of the shift is topic-driven vs. ideology-driven.** Migration is inherently more controversial than other policy domains. If the volume of migration motions increased post-2024, centrist support for the category may reflect the topic's higher baseline controversy rather than shifting ideology.
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3. **We cannot distinguish between sincere ideological shift and strategic adjustment.** Centrist parties may genuinely agree more with right-wing content, or they may be voting differently for coalition-management or electoral reasons.
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### Uncertainty hierarchy
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| Evidence Level | Indicator | Status |
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|---------------|-----------|--------|
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| **Strong** | Centrist support surge (opposition-controlled) | Confirmed |
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| **Moderate** | Migration-specificity of the shift | Confirmed |
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| **Inconclusive** | Extremity-stratified tolerance shift | Underpowered (pass rate ceiling) |
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| **Inconclusive** | SVD spatial drift | Axes unstable |
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| **Weak** | Content extremity trend | No increase (but LLM scoring imperfect) |
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---
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## 6. Limitations
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- **Small-N time series:** 8 pre-2024 years, 3 post-2024 years (2026 is partial). Effect sizes are descriptive, not confirmatory.
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- **LLM extremity scores:** 75% audit agreement; borderline. Scores conflate stylistic and substantive radicalism. See deferred follow-up work for two-dimensional rescoring plan.
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- **SVD axis instability:** Cross-window SVD comparison is invalid without alignment. Spatial indicator discarded.
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- **Coalition composition:** Hardcoded per year. 2024 is ambiguous (Rutte IV until July, Schoof thereafter). Early 2024 motions may be miscoded.
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- **Submitter party identification:** Parsed from motion title prefixes. ~10% of motions have non-standard titles (bills, amendments) and are excluded from opposition-only analysis.
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- **Pass rate baseline:** Computed across motions with recorded votes. Unanimous consent motions are excluded, potentially biasing baseline upward. The Dutch parliament's near-universal passage rate makes pass rate a poor sensitivity measure.
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---
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## 7. Figures
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1. `breakpoint_figure_1.png` — Centrist support and pass rate over time (all RW, opposition-only, migration, non-migration, + baseline)
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2. `breakpoint_figure_2.png` — Extremity trends and extremity-stratified pass rate (pre vs. post 2024)
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3. `svd_drift_chart.png` — SVD centrist center trajectory (unreliable — axes unstable)
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---
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## 8. Next Steps
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1. **Commit findings** and archive the analysis on `feat/right-wing-motion-analysis`.
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2. **Two-dimensional extremity rescoring** (deferred): Validate whether LLM scores capture stylistic vs. material radicalism on a stratified sample. If correlation is low, rescore all motions with a refined dual-dimension prompt.
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3. **Procrustes-aligned SVD** (optional): If spatial evidence is desired, rerun U3 using `load_party_scores_all_windows_aligned` from `explorer_data.py` for a common reference frame.
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4. **Temporal decomposition of migration vs. other domains:** The 2024 shift may be partially explained by the increased volume of migration motions, rather than a general rightward shift. Disentangle topic composition from ideological drift.
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# SVD Center Drift & Axis Stability Report
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## Axis Stability Validation
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**Stability threshold:** Spearman ρ ≥ 0.7 for both axes. Maximum unstable pairs allowed: 2.
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**Result:** 9 unstable pair(s) out of 10 consecutive window pairs.
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**CONCLUSION: SVD axes are too unstable for longitudinal comparison. Positions may reflect re-orientation rather than genuine drift. The following drift metrics and chart should be interpreted with extreme caution.**
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- Mean axis-1 correlation: 0.0054
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- Mean axis-2 correlation: 0.2128
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### Per-Pair Stability Details
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| Window Pair | Axis 1 ρ | Axis 2 ρ | Unstable | Shared Parties |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 2016-2017 | -0.439 | 0.257 | **YES** | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, GrBvK, GroenLinks-PvdA, Houwers, Klein, Krol, Monasch, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, Van Vliet |
|
||||
| 2017-2018 | -0.779 | 0.876 | **YES** | 50PLUS, BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FVD, GroenLinks-PvdA, Groep Van Haga, Krol, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD |
|
||||
| 2018-2019 | 0.897 | -0.024 | **YES** | 50PLUS, BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FVD, GroenLinks-PvdA, Groep Van Haga, Krol, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD |
|
||||
| 2019-2020 | -0.819 | 0.353 | **YES** | 50PLUS, BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FVD, GroenLinks-PvdA, Groep Van Haga, Krol, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, vKA |
|
||||
| 2020-2021 | 0.797 | -0.772 | **YES** | 50PLUS, BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FVD, GroenLinks-PvdA, Groep Van Haga, Krol, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, vKA |
|
||||
| 2021-2022 | 0.893 | 0.910 | no | BBB, BIJ1, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, Ephraim, FVD, Fractie Den Haan, GroenLinks-PvdA, Groep Van Haga, JA21, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, Volt |
|
||||
| 2022-2023 | 0.889 | -0.379 | **YES** | BBB, BIJ1, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, Ephraim, FVD, Fractie Den Haan, GroenLinks-PvdA, Groep Van Haga, JA21, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, Volt |
|
||||
| 2023-2024 | -0.229 | 0.821 | **YES** | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FVD, GroenLinks-PvdA, JA21, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, Volt |
|
||||
| 2024-2025 | -0.757 | 0.779 | **YES** | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FVD, GroenLinks-PvdA, JA21, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, Volt |
|
||||
| 2025-2026 | -0.400 | -0.694 | **YES** | 50PLUS, BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FVD, GroenLinks-PvdA, JA21, NSC, PVV, PvdD, SGP, SP, VVD, Volt |
|
||||
|
||||
## Centrist Center of Gravity
|
||||
|
||||
| Window | Centrist Ax1 | Centrist Ax2 | Right Ax1 | Right Ax2 | Centrist Parties Present | Right Parties Present |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 2016 | 5.1514 | 0.1220 | 5.6432 | 0.5936 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2017 | -3.6524 | -0.7100 | -3.7095 | 1.3546 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2018 | 5.1662 | -0.8347 | 2.2336 | 3.7263 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2019 | 11.7312 | -2.6126 | 7.1092 | 6.5966 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2020 | -27.1482 | 2.8304 | -9.2387 | -14.1063 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2021 | -15.9032 | -0.6795 | -6.3142 | 19.8728 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, JA21, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2022 | -28.5270 | -0.6204 | -3.8504 | 19.8373 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, JA21, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2023 | -15.7130 | 0.1571 | -5.0623 | -15.8667 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, JA21, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2024 | 26.2822 | 19.2003 | 24.9072 | -0.8372 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, JA21, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2025 | -8.1667 | 12.0249 | -14.5604 | 1.7604 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, JA21, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
| 2026 | -13.6251 | 3.4321 | -3.8011 | 16.7538 | BBB, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, NSC, VVD | FVD, JA21, PVV, SGP |
|
||||
|
||||
## Drift Metrics (UNRELIABLE — Axes Unstable)
|
||||
|
||||
Drift metrics were computed but are unreliable due to axis instability. Cross-window comparisons on unstable axes conflate positional change with axis re-orientation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Chart
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Interpretability Statement
|
||||
|
||||
SVD axes are too unstable for longitudinal comparison. The trajectory plotted above may reflect axis re-orientation (each SVD window independently determines its principal axes) rather than genuine ideological drift. We recommend against drawing conclusions from this analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Note: SVD axes reflect voting patterns, not semantic content. A shift means voting behavior changed, not that parties changed their rhetoric. See: docs/solutions/best-practices/svd-labels-voting-patterns-not-semantics.md*
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user