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motief/reports/overton_window/breakpoint_analysis.md

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Overton Window Breakpoint Analysis

Goal: Quantify the 2024 structural break in centrist support and content extremity for right-wing motions in the Tweede Kamer.

Analysis period: 2016–2026 Right-wing parties: PVV, FVD, JA21, SGP Centrist parties: VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU Left parties: PvdA, GL, SP, PvdD, Volt, DENK, Bij1


1. Yearly Aggregate Metrics (All Right-Wing Motions)

Year N (RW) Centrist Support Extremity Right Support Left Opp.
2016 6 0.722 2.00 1.000 0.708
2017 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2018 5 1.000 1.40 0.800 0.480
2019 195 0.410 2.14 0.838 0.746
2020 469 0.326 2.26 0.818 0.758
2021 425 0.339 2.24 0.903 0.788
2022 446 0.404 2.16 0.891 0.820
2023 365 0.457 2.24 0.900 0.821
2024 469 0.670 1.99 0.885 0.756
2025 455 0.597 2.25 0.895 0.799
2026 151 0.518 2.33 0.916 0.834

2. Pre/Post 2024 Comparison

Break year: 2024

All right-wing motions

Metric Pre-2024 Mean Post-2024 Mean Δ Cohen's d
Centrist Support 0.384 0.618 +0.234 +0.68
Extremity 2.21 2.15 -0.07 -0.09

Interpretation: Cohen's d values quantify effect sizes (|d| < 0.2 small, 0.5 medium, > 0.8 large). These are descriptive, not inferential — with only 8 pre-2024 years and 3 post-2024 years, statistical significance is not claimed.

Opposition-only right-wing motions

Metric Pre-2024 Mean Post-2024 Mean Δ Cohen's d N pre / N post
Centrist Support 0.270 0.543 +0.272 +0.85 1295 / 405
Extremity 2.28 2.18 -0.10 -0.14 1295 / 405

Interpretation gate: If opposition metrics also rise post-2024, the shift is not purely coalition-driven. If opposition metrics stay flat while overall metrics rise, the shift is coalition-specific.

3. Coalition Composition

2016-2017: Rutte II (VVD/PvdA). 2018-2021: Rutte III (VVD/CDA/D66/CU). 2022-2023: Rutte IV (VVD/D66/CDA/CU). 2024-2026: Schoof (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB). 2024 ambiguous: Schoof cabinet started July 2024; all 2024 motions are coded to the Schoof coalition. Coalition effect may be overestimated for early 2024.

Submitter party is parsed from motion title prefixes (e.g., "Motie van het lid Wilders over ..."). Only the lead submitter's party is considered. Multi-submitter motions may have a coalition member as co-submitter but still be counted as opposition if the lead submitter is not in the coalition.

4. Domain Decomposition

Migration = category asiel/vreemdelingen. Non-migration = all other categories.

Domain Pre-2024 Mean CS Post-2024 Mean CS Δ CS
Migration 0.303 0.536 +0.233
Non-migration 0.529 0.605 +0.076

5. Extremity-Stratified Centrist Support

Bucket Period N Mean CS Median CS P25 P75
1-2 (mild) Pre-2024 221 0.522 0.400 0.250 1.000
Post-2024 181 0.775 1.000 0.600 1.000
2-3 (moderate) Pre-2024 1205 0.403 0.250 0.000 0.750
Post-2024 640 0.606 0.600 0.250 1.000
3-4 (high) Pre-2024 352 0.295 0.250 0.000 0.500
Post-2024 175 0.565 0.600 0.250 0.800
4-5 (extreme) Pre-2024 133 0.212 0.250 0.000 0.250
Post-2024 79 0.474 0.500 0.250 0.800

Key test: If centrist support for high-extremity motions (3-5) rose disproportionately post-2024 while centrist support for mild motions stayed flat, centrists are more tolerant of extreme content — direct Overton shift evidence. If centrist support rose uniformly across all buckets, the shift is about volume (more motions) rather than tolerance. If only the 1-2 bucket rose, right-wing parties filed milder motions post-2024 and the 'shift' is illusory.

6. Manual Extremity Audit

Audit notes: Perform manual audit by reviewing the motions below. Record agreement per motion. Note whether the LLM score appears driven by stylistic extremity (inflammatory phrasing) or material impact (substantive rights restriction, institutional change). If agreement < 70%, flag LLM scoring as unreliable for the stratified analysis.

# Year Category LLM Score Bucket Agreed? Driver
1 2024 economie/belasting 1 1-2 (mild)
2 2020 economie/belasting 1 1-2 (mild)
3 2019 veiligheid/justitie 1 1-2 (mild)
4 2025 economie/belasting 1 1-2 (mild)
5 2022 sociaal/jeugd 1 1-2 (mild)
6 2021 corona/pandemie 2 2-3 (moderate)
7 2021 zorg/gezondheid 2 2-3 (moderate)
8 2020 economie/belasting 2 2-3 (moderate)
9 2025 veiligheid/justitie 2 2-3 (moderate)
10 2020 economie/belasting 2 2-3 (moderate)
11 2020 veiligheid/justitie 3 3-4 (high)
12 2025 klimaat/milieu 3 3-4 (high)
13 2019 asiel/vreemdelingen 3 3-4 (high)
14 2019 landbouw/stikstof 3 3-4 (high)
15 2020 klimaat/milieu 3 3-4 (high)
16 2020 veiligheid/justitie 4 4-5 (extreme)
17 2021 defensie/buitenland 4 4-5 (extreme)
18 2023 asiel/vreemdelingen 4 4-5 (extreme)
19 2025 asiel/vreemdelingen 4 4-5 (extreme)
20 2019 sociaal/jeugd 4 4-5 (extreme)

7. Limitations

  • Small-N time series: 8 pre-2024 years and at most 3 post-2024 years (2026 is partial). Effect sizes are descriptive, not confirmatory.
  • LLM extremity scores: Content-based, not independently validated beyond the manual audit above. See §6 for agreement rate and noted biases.
  • Coalition composition: Hardcoded per year. 2024 is ambiguous (Rutte IV until July, Schoof thereafter). Early 2024 motions may be miscoded as Schoof-era.
  • Submitter party identification: Parsed from motion title prefixes (e.g., 'Motie van het lid X'). May be inaccurate for multi-submitter motions or complex title formats.
  • Keyword penetration not analyzed: The right-wing keyword set was derived differentially from right-wing motions, making it circular for adoption analysis.

8. Figures

Figure 1: Centrist Support Over Time Figure 2: Extremity Trends and Stratified Centrist Support

9. Conclusion

(Fill in after reviewing all indicators and audit results.)