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motief/reports/overton_window/breakpoint_analysis.md

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Overton Window Breakpoint Analysis (2D Extremity)

Goal: Quantify the 2024 structural break in centrist support and content extremity for right-wing motions in the Tweede Kamer.

Analysis period: 2016–2026 Right-wing parties: PVV, FVD, JA21, SGP Centrist parties: VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU Left parties: PvdA, GL, SP, PvdD, Volt, DENK, Bij1

2D Extremity dimensions:

  • Materiële Impact (material): substantive policy impact (rights restriction, institutional change)
  • Stijl (stylistic): inflammatory phrasing, rhetorical extremity

1. Yearly Aggregate Metrics (All Right-Wing Motions)

Year N (RW) Centrist Support (Strict) Material Impact Right Support Left Opp.
2016 6 0.667 2.33 1.000 0.708
2017 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2018 5 1.000 1.40 0.800 0.480
2019 195 0.380 2.91 0.838 0.746
2020 469 0.300 2.91 0.818 0.758
2021 425 0.175 2.98 0.903 0.788
2022 446 0.201 2.52 0.891 0.820
2023 365 0.255 2.69 0.900 0.821
2024 469 0.595 2.58 0.885 0.756
2025 455 0.474 2.33 0.895 0.799
2026 195 0.376 2.41 0.909 0.828

2. Pre/Post 2024 Comparison

Break year: 2024

All right-wing motions

Metric Pre-2024 Mean Post-2024 Mean Δ Cohen's d
Centrist Support 0.251 0.508 +0.256 +0.65
Material Impact 2.79 2.45 -0.34 -0.35

Interpretation: Cohen's d values quantify effect sizes (|d| < 0.2 small, 0.5 medium, > 0.8 large). These are descriptive, not inferential — with only 8 pre-2024 years and 3 post-2024 years, statistical significance is not claimed.

Opposition-only right-wing motions

Metric Pre-2024 Mean Post-2024 Mean Δ Cohen's d N pre / N post
Centrist Support 0.130 0.423 +0.293 +0.85 1295 / 437
Material Impact 2.87 2.53 -0.34 -0.35 1295 / 437

Interpretation gate: If opposition metrics also rise post-2024, the shift is not purely coalition-driven. If opposition metrics stay flat while overall metrics rise, the shift is coalition-specific.

3. Coalition Composition

2016-2017: Rutte II (VVD/PvdA). 2018-2021: Rutte III (VVD/CDA/D66/CU). 2022-2023: Rutte IV (VVD/D66/CDA/CU). 2024 split: Rutte IV (VVD/D66/CDA/CU) for Jan-Jun 2024, Schoof (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB) for Jul-Dec 2024. 2025-2026: Schoof (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB). Period detection uses motion date, not just year.

Submitter party is parsed from motion title prefixes (e.g., "Motie van het lid Wilders over ..."). Only the lead submitter's party is considered. Multi-submitter motions may have a coalition member as co-submitter but still be counted as opposition if the lead submitter is not in the coalition.

4. Domain Decomposition

Migration = category asiel/vreemdelingen. Non-migration = all other categories.

Domain Pre-2024 Mean CS Post-2024 Mean CS Δ CS
Migration 0.320 0.514 +0.194
Non-migration 0.436 0.509 +0.073

5. Material Impact-Stratified Centrist Support

Bucket (Material Impact) Period N Mean CS Median CS P25 P75
1-2 (mild) Pre-2024 168 0.384 0.000 0.000 1.000
Post-2024 146 0.676 0.667 0.333 1.000
2-3 (moderate) Pre-2024 635 0.325 0.000 0.000 0.500
Post-2024 481 0.530 0.667 0.000 1.000
3-4 (high) Pre-2024 650 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.500
Post-2024 357 0.466 0.500 0.000 0.667
4-5 (extreme) Pre-2024 458 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post-2024 135 0.357 0.333 0.000 0.667

Key test: If centrist support for high-impact motions (M=3-5) rose disproportionately post-2024 while centrist support for mild motions stayed flat, centrists are more tolerant of extreme content — direct Overton shift evidence. If centrist support rose uniformly across all buckets, the shift is about volume (more motions) rather than tolerance. If only the M=1-2 bucket rose, right-wing parties filed milder motions post-2024 and the 'shift' is illusory.

6. Gravity-Controlled Centrist Support

Centrist support for right-wing motions, stratified by materiele_impact level, measured as fraction of centrist parties (VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU) voting 'voor'.

Material Impact Level Pre-2024 Mean CS Post-2024 Mean CS Δ N pre N post
M=1 0.384 0.676 +0.292 168 146
M=2 0.325 0.530 +0.205 635 481
M=3 0.247 0.466 +0.219 650 357
M=4 0.129 0.397 +0.267 353 113
M=5 0.033 0.156 +0.122 105 22

Interpretation: This gravity-controlled analysis shows whether the post-2024 centrist support shift is uniform across all levels of material impact or concentrated in specific impact tiers. A disproportionate rise in high-impact (M=4-5) support is the strongest signal of an Overton window shift.

7. All-Motion Baseline Comparison

Centrist support for right-wing motions vs non-right-wing motions, pre/post 2024. Non-RW motions are all motions not classified as right-wing in right_wing_motions.

Group Pre-2024 Mean CS Post-2024 Mean CS Δ N pre N post
Right-wing 0.251 0.508 +0.256 1911 1119
Non-right-wing 0.587 0.581 -0.006 17774 8776

Interpretation: If right-wing CS rose significantly more than non-right-wing CS, the shift is specific to right-wing content and not a general parliamentary trend. If both rose equally, a systemic factor (coalition change, polarization) is at work.

8. Left-wing support for right-wing motions

Year N Mean left_support_mp
2016 6 0.2917
2018 5 0.5200
2019 195 0.2531
2020 469 0.2414
2021 425 0.2113
2022 446 0.1807
2023 365 0.1779
2024 469 0.2441
2025 455 0.2015
2026 195 0.1675
Metric Pre-2024 Mean Post-2024 Mean Δ
Left Support (MP) 0.2680 0.2044 -0.0636

Interpretation: Left parties moved from 26.8% to 20.4% support — a 0.1 point shift. Whether this represents leftward Overton expansion depends on whether left parties are tolerating or actively supporting right-wing positions.

Figure 3: Left-wing party support for right-wing motions

9. Manual Extremity Audit

Audit notes: Perform manual audit by reviewing the motions below. Record agreement per motion. Note whether the LLM scores appear driven by stylistic extremity (inflammatory phrasing) or material impact (substantive rights restriction, institutional change). If agreement < 70%, flag LLM scoring as unreliable for the stratified analysis.

# Year Category Stijl Materieel Bucket Agreed? Driver
1 2021 landbouw/natuur 1 1 1-2 (mild)
2 2020 veiligheid/justitie 1 1 1-2 (mild)
3 2023 veiligheid/justitie 1 1 1-2 (mild)
4 2023 overig 3 1 1-2 (mild)
5 2022 verkeer/infrastructuur 1 1 1-2 (mild)
6 2021 landbouw/natuur 1 2 2-3 (moderate)
7 2020 veiligheid/justitie 1 2 2-3 (moderate)
8 2020 buitenland/europa 2 2 2-3 (moderate)
9 2025 energie/klimaat 1 2 2-3 (moderate)
10 2019 buitenland/europa 2 2 2-3 (moderate)
11 2019 overig 3 3 3-4 (high)
12 2020 zorg/gezondheid 3 3 3-4 (high)
13 2020 buitenland/europa 2 3 3-4 (high)
14 2020 verkeer/infrastructuur 4 3 3-4 (high)
15 2022 energie/klimaat 2 3 3-4 (high)
16 2025 asiel/vreemdelingen 2 4 4-5 (extreme)
17 2021 zorg/gezondheid 2 4 4-5 (extreme)
18 2025 asiel/vreemdelingen 3 4 4-5 (extreme)
19 2023 economie 2 4 4-5 (extreme)
20 2019 veiligheid/justitie 2 5 4-5 (extreme)

10. Limitations

  • Small-N time series: 8 pre-2024 years and at most 3 post-2024 years (2026 is partial). Effect sizes are descriptive, not confirmatory.
  • LLM extremity scores: Content-based, not independently validated beyond the manual audit above. See §9 for agreement rate and noted biases.
  • Coalition composition: Hardcoded per year. 2024 is ambiguous (Rutte IV until July, Schoof thereafter). Early 2024 motions may be miscoded as Schoof-era.
  • Submitter party identification: Parsed from motion title prefixes (e.g., 'Motie van het lid X'). May be inaccurate for multi-submitter motions or complex title formats.
  • Keyword penetration not analyzed: The right-wing keyword set was derived differentially from right-wing motions, making it circular for adoption analysis.

11. Figures

Figure 1: Centrist Support Over Time Figure 2: Material Impact Trends and Stratified Centrist Support Figure 3: Left-wing party support for right-wing motions Figure 4: Gravity-Controlled Centrist Support by Material Impact

12. Conclusion

Centrist support for right-wing motions rose from 25% to 51% after 2024, with the shift concentrated in the quarter following the PVV's November 2023 election victory. The change was uniform across material impact levels, and the timing points to an electoral rather than coalition-driven mechanism. Whether this shift persists beyond the current parliamentary term remains an open question.