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207 lines
9.6 KiB
207 lines
9.6 KiB
# Overton Window Breakpoint Analysis (2D Extremity)
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**Goal:** Quantify the 2024 structural break in centrist support
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and content extremity for right-wing motions in the Tweede Kamer.
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**Analysis period:** 2016–2026
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**Right-wing parties:** PVV, FVD, JA21, SGP
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**Centrist parties:** VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU
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**Left parties:** PvdA, GL, SP, PvdD, Volt, DENK, Bij1
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**2D Extremity dimensions:**
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- **Materiële Impact** (material): substantive policy impact (rights restriction, institutional change)
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- **Stijl** (stylistic): inflammatory phrasing, rhetorical extremity
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---
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## 1. Yearly Aggregate Metrics (All Right-Wing Motions)
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| Year | N (RW) | Centrist Support (Strict) | Material Impact | Right Support | Left Opp. |
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|------|--------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------|
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| 2016 | 6 | 0.667 | 2.33 | 1.000 | 0.708 |
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| 2017 | 0 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
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| 2018 | 5 | 1.000 | 1.40 | 0.800 | 0.480 |
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| 2019 | 195 | 0.380 | 2.91 | 0.838 | 0.746 |
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| 2020 | 469 | 0.300 | 2.91 | 0.818 | 0.758 |
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| 2021 | 425 | 0.175 | 2.98 | 0.903 | 0.788 |
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| 2022 | 446 | 0.201 | 2.52 | 0.891 | 0.820 |
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| 2023 | 365 | 0.255 | 2.69 | 0.900 | 0.821 |
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| 2024 | 469 | 0.595 | 2.58 | 0.885 | 0.756 |
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| 2025 | 455 | 0.474 | 2.33 | 0.895 | 0.799 |
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| 2026 | 195 | 0.376 | 2.41 | 0.909 | 0.828 |
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## 2. Pre/Post 2024 Comparison
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**Break year:** 2024
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### All right-wing motions
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| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen's d |
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|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|-----------|
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| Centrist Support | 0.251 | 0.508 | +0.256 | +0.65 |
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| Material Impact | 2.79 | 2.45 | -0.34 | -0.35 |
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**Interpretation:** Cohen's d values quantify effect sizes (|d| < 0.2 small, 0.5 medium, > 0.8 large).
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These are descriptive, not inferential — with only 8 pre-2024 years and 3 post-2024 years, statistical significance is not claimed.
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### Opposition-only right-wing motions
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| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen's d | N pre / N post |
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|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|-----------|---------------|
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| Centrist Support | 0.130 | 0.423 | +0.293 | +0.85 | 1295 / 437 |
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| Material Impact | 2.87 | 2.53 | -0.34 | -0.35 | 1295 / 437 |
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**Interpretation gate:** If opposition metrics also rise post-2024, the shift is not
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purely coalition-driven. If opposition metrics stay flat while overall metrics rise,
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the shift is coalition-specific.
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## 3. Coalition Composition
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2016-2017: Rutte II (VVD/PvdA). 2018-2021: Rutte III (VVD/CDA/D66/CU). 2022-2023: Rutte IV (VVD/D66/CDA/CU). 2024 split: Rutte IV (VVD/D66/CDA/CU) for Jan-Jun 2024, Schoof (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB) for Jul-Dec 2024. 2025-2026: Schoof (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB). Period detection uses motion date, not just year.
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Submitter party is parsed from motion title prefixes
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(e.g., "Motie van het lid Wilders over ..."). Only the lead submitter's party is
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considered. Multi-submitter motions may have a coalition member as co-submitter
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but still be counted as opposition if the lead submitter is not in the coalition.
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## 4. Domain Decomposition
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Migration = category `asiel/vreemdelingen`. Non-migration = all other categories.
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| Domain | Pre-2024 Mean CS | Post-2024 Mean CS | Δ CS |
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|--------|-----------------|------------------|------|
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| Migration | 0.125 | 0.343 | +0.218 |
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| Non-migration | 0.436 | 0.509 | +0.073 |
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## 5. Material Impact-Stratified Centrist Support
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| Bucket (Material Impact) | Period | N | Mean CS | Median CS | P25 | P75 |
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|--------------------------|--------|---|---------|-----------|---|-----|
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| 1-2 (mild) | Pre-2024 | 168 | 0.384 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
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| | Post-2024 | 146 | 0.676 | 0.667 | 0.333 | 1.000 |
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| 2-3 (moderate) | Pre-2024 | 635 | 0.325 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.500 |
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| | Post-2024 | 481 | 0.530 | 0.667 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
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| 3-4 (high) | Pre-2024 | 650 | 0.247 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.500 |
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| | Post-2024 | 357 | 0.466 | 0.500 | 0.000 | 0.667 |
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| 4-5 (extreme) | Pre-2024 | 458 | 0.107 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
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| | Post-2024 | 135 | 0.357 | 0.333 | 0.000 | 0.667 |
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**Key test:** If centrist support for high-impact motions (M=3-5) rose
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disproportionately post-2024 while centrist support for mild motions stayed flat,
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centrists are more tolerant of extreme content — direct Overton shift evidence.
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If centrist support rose uniformly across all buckets, the shift is about volume
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(more motions) rather than tolerance. If only the M=1-2 bucket rose, right-wing
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parties filed milder motions post-2024 and the 'shift' is illusory.
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## 6. Gravity-Controlled Centrist Support
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Centrist support for right-wing motions, stratified by materiele_impact level,
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measured as fraction of centrist parties (VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU) voting 'voor'.
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| Material Impact Level | Pre-2024 Mean CS | Post-2024 Mean CS | Δ | N pre | N post |
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|----------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|-------|--------|
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| M=1 | 0.384 | 0.676 | +0.292 | 168 | 146 |
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| M=2 | 0.325 | 0.530 | +0.205 | 635 | 481 |
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| M=3 | 0.247 | 0.466 | +0.219 | 650 | 357 |
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| M=4 | 0.129 | 0.397 | +0.267 | 353 | 113 |
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| M=5 | 0.033 | 0.156 | +0.122 | 105 | 22 |
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**Interpretation:** This gravity-controlled analysis shows whether the post-2024
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centrist support shift is uniform across all levels of material impact or
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concentrated in specific impact tiers. A disproportionate rise in high-impact (M=4-5)
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support is the strongest signal of an Overton window shift.
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## 7. All-Motion Baseline Comparison
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Centrist support for right-wing motions vs non-right-wing motions, pre/post 2024.
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Non-RW motions are all motions not classified as right-wing in right_wing_motions.
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| Group | Pre-2024 Mean CS | Post-2024 Mean CS | Δ | N pre | N post |
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|------|-----------------|------------------|-----|-------|--------|
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| Right-wing | 0.251 | 0.508 | +0.256 | 1911 | 1119 |
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| Non-right-wing | 0.587 | 0.581 | -0.006 | 17774 | 8776 |
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**Interpretation:** If right-wing CS rose significantly more than non-right-wing CS,
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the shift is specific to right-wing content and not a general parliamentary trend.
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If both rose equally, a systemic factor (coalition change, polarization) is at work.
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## 8. Left-wing support for right-wing motions
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| Year | N | Mean left_support_mp |
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|------|---|---------------------|
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| 2016 | 6 | 0.2917 |
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| 2018 | 5 | 0.5200 |
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| 2019 | 195 | 0.2531 |
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| 2020 | 469 | 0.2414 |
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| 2021 | 425 | 0.2113 |
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| 2022 | 446 | 0.1807 |
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| 2023 | 365 | 0.1779 |
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| 2024 | 469 | 0.2441 |
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| 2025 | 455 | 0.2015 |
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| 2026 | 195 | 0.1675 |
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| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ |
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|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|
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| Left Support (MP) | 0.2680 | 0.2044 | -0.0636 |
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**Interpretation:** Left parties moved from 26.8% to 20.4% support — a 0.1 point shift. Whether this represents leftward Overton expansion depends on whether left parties are tolerating or actively supporting right-wing positions.
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## 9. Manual Extremity Audit
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**Audit notes:** Perform manual audit by reviewing the motions below. Record agreement per motion. Note whether the LLM scores appear driven by *stylistic extremity* (inflammatory phrasing) or *material impact* (substantive rights restriction, institutional change). If agreement < 70%, flag LLM scoring as unreliable for the stratified analysis.
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| # | Year | Category | Stijl | Materieel | Bucket | Agreed? | Driver |
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|---|------|----------|-------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|
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| 1 | 2021 | landbouw/natuur | 1 | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | | |
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| 2 | 2020 | veiligheid/justitie | 1 | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | | |
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| 3 | 2023 | veiligheid/justitie | 1 | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | | |
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| 4 | 2023 | overig | 3 | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | | |
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| 5 | 2022 | verkeer/infrastructuur | 1 | 1 | 1-2 (mild) | | |
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| 6 | 2021 | landbouw/natuur | 1 | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | | |
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| 7 | 2020 | veiligheid/justitie | 1 | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | | |
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| 8 | 2020 | buitenland/europa | 2 | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | | |
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| 9 | 2025 | energie/klimaat | 1 | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | | |
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| 10 | 2019 | buitenland/europa | 2 | 2 | 2-3 (moderate) | | |
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| 11 | 2019 | overig | 3 | 3 | 3-4 (high) | | |
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| 12 | 2020 | zorg/gezondheid | 3 | 3 | 3-4 (high) | | |
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| 13 | 2020 | buitenland/europa | 2 | 3 | 3-4 (high) | | |
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| 14 | 2020 | verkeer/infrastructuur | 4 | 3 | 3-4 (high) | | |
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| 15 | 2022 | energie/klimaat | 2 | 3 | 3-4 (high) | | |
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| 16 | 2025 | asiel/vreemdelingen | 2 | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | | |
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| 17 | 2021 | zorg/gezondheid | 2 | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | | |
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| 18 | 2025 | asiel/vreemdelingen | 3 | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | | |
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| 19 | 2023 | economie | 2 | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | | |
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| 20 | 2019 | veiligheid/justitie | 2 | 5 | 4-5 (extreme) | | |
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## 10. Limitations
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- **Small-N time series:** 8 pre-2024 years and at most 3 post-2024 years (2026 is partial).
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Effect sizes are descriptive, not confirmatory.
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- **LLM extremity scores:** Content-based, not independently validated beyond the
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manual audit above. See §9 for agreement rate and noted biases.
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- **Coalition composition:** Hardcoded per year. 2024 is ambiguous (Rutte IV until July,
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Schoof thereafter). Early 2024 motions may be miscoded as Schoof-era.
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- **Submitter party identification:** Parsed from motion title prefixes (e.g.,
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'Motie van het lid X'). May be inaccurate for multi-submitter motions or
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complex title formats.
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- **Keyword penetration not analyzed:** The right-wing keyword set was derived
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differentially from right-wing motions, making it circular for adoption analysis.
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## 11. Figures
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## 12. Conclusion
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*(Fill in after reviewing all indicators and audit results.)* |