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226 lines
7.3 KiB
226 lines
7.3 KiB
# Left-Wing Response to Right-Wing Motions
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**Goal:** Determine whether the centrist support surge reflects right-wing
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moderation, centrist acceptance, or left-wing opposition hardening.
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**Analysis period:** 2016–2026
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**Left parties:** SP, GroenLinks-PvdA, PvdD, Volt, DENK
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**Centrist (strict):** D66, CDA, CU, NSC
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**Right-wing:** PVV, FVD, JA21, SGP
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---
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## 1. Yearly Support Metrics (All Right-Wing Motions)
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| Year | N | Left Support | Centrist Support | Polarization Gap |
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|------|---|-------------|-----------------|------------------|
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| 2016 | 6 | 0.2917 | 0.667 | +0.375 |
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| 2018 | 5 | 0.5200 | 1.000 | +0.480 |
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| 2019 | 195 | 0.2531 | 0.380 | +0.127 |
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| 2020 | 469 | 0.2414 | 0.300 | +0.058 |
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| 2021 | 425 | 0.2113 | 0.175 | -0.036 |
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| 2022 | 446 | 0.1807 | 0.201 | +0.020 |
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| 2023 | 365 | 0.1779 | 0.255 | +0.077 |
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| 2024 | 469 | 0.2441 | 0.595 | +0.351 |
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| 2025 | 455 | 0.2015 | 0.474 | +0.272 |
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| 2026 | 151 | 0.1594 | 0.334 | +0.174 |
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> Note: 2016 (n=6) and 2018 (n=5) have very small sample sizes and
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inflate pre-2024 means. Adjusted means below exclude these years.
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---
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## 2. Pre/Post 2024 Comparison
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**Break year:** 2024
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### All years (unadjusted)
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| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen d |
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|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|----------|
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| Left Support (MP) | 0.2680 | 0.2017 | -0.0663 | -0.75 |
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| Centrist Support | 0.425 | 0.468 | +0.042 | +0.18 |
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| Polarization Gap | 0.157 | 0.266 | +0.109 | — |
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### Excluding low-N years (<50 motions: 2016, 2018)
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| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen d |
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|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|----------|
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| Left Support (MP) | 0.2129 | 0.2017 | -0.0112 | — |
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| Centrist Support | 0.262 | 0.468 | +0.206 | +1.89 |
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| Polarization Gap | 0.049 | 0.266 | +0.217 | — |
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**Interpretation:**
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- Centrist support surged from 26.2% to 46.8% (d=+1.89).
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- Left support shifted from 21.3% to 20.2% (d=-0.75).
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- The polarization gap **widened** by +0.217, driven predominantly by the centrist acceptance surge rather than left-wing hardening.
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---
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## 3. Per-Party Left Support (Pre vs Post 2024)
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Party-level support ratios computed from raw mp_votes data.
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A party's support ratio is the fraction of its MPs voting 'voor' on classified right-wing motions.
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| Party | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Pre N MPs (avg) | Post N MPs (avg) |
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|-------|--------------|---------------|-----|-----------------|------------------|
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| SP | 0.2945 | 0.2186 | -0.0759 | 297 | 405 |
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| GroenLinks-PvdA | 0.2610 | 0.1504 | -0.1106 | 587 | 550 |
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| PvdD | 0.1357 | 0.0668 | -0.0689 | 283 | 372 |
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| Volt | 0.1122 | 0.2415 | +0.1293 | 387 | 361 |
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| DENK | 0.4007 | 0.2780 | -0.1227 | 319 | 375 |
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---
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## 4. Domain Decomposition (Migration vs Non-Migration)
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Migration = category 'asiel/vreemdelingen'.
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Non-migration = all other categories.
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| Domain | Period | Left Support | Centrist Support | Gap | N |
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|--------|--------|-------------|-----------------|-----|---|
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| migration | Pre-2024 | 0.0571 | 0.146 | +0.089 | 233 |
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| migration | Post-2024 | 0.1062 | 0.361 | +0.255 | 171 |
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| non-migration | Pre-2024 | 0.2824 | 0.435 | +0.153 | 1678 |
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| non-migration | Post-2024 | 0.2192 | 0.487 | +0.268 | 904 |
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---
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## 5. Per-Party Yearly Breakdown
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### SP
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| Year | Voor | Cast | Support Ratio |
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|------|------|------|---------------|
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| 2016 | 1 | 6 | 0.1667 |
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| 2018 | 2 | 5 | 0.4000 |
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| 2019 | 61 | 241 | 0.2531 |
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| 2020 | 128 | 491 | 0.2607 |
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| 2021 | 108 | 440 | 0.2455 |
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| 2022 | 190 | 488 | 0.3893 |
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| 2023 | 142 | 410 | 0.3463 |
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| 2024 | 119 | 497 | 0.2394 |
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| 2025 | 136 | 564 | 0.2411 |
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| 2026 | 27 | 154 | 0.1753 |
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### GroenLinks-PvdA
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| Year | Voor | Cast | Support Ratio |
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|------|------|------|---------------|
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| 2016 | 6 | 12 | 0.5000 |
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| 2018 | 9 | 10 | 0.9000 |
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| 2019 | 72 | 473 | 0.1522 |
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| 2020 | 154 | 968 | 0.1591 |
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| 2021 | 47 | 873 | 0.0538 |
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| 2022 | 25 | 966 | 0.0259 |
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| 2023 | 29 | 804 | 0.0361 |
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| 2024 | 131 | 621 | 0.2110 |
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| 2025 | 106 | 859 | 0.1234 |
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| 2026 | 20 | 171 | 0.1170 |
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### PvdD
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| Year | Voor | Cast | Support Ratio |
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|------|------|------|---------------|
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| 2016 | 0 | 6 | 0.0000 |
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| 2018 | 0 | 5 | 0.0000 |
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| 2019 | 40 | 204 | 0.1961 |
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| 2020 | 96 | 471 | 0.2038 |
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| 2021 | 90 | 432 | 0.2083 |
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| 2022 | 87 | 470 | 0.1851 |
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| 2023 | 62 | 396 | 0.1566 |
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| 2024 | 45 | 483 | 0.0932 |
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| 2025 | 39 | 481 | 0.0811 |
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| 2026 | 4 | 153 | 0.0261 |
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### Volt
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| Year | Voor | Cast | Support Ratio |
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|------|------|------|---------------|
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| 2016 | 0 | 0 | N/A |
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| 2018 | 0 | 0 | N/A |
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| 2019 | 0 | 0 | N/A |
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| 2020 | 0 | 0 | N/A |
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| 2021 | 42 | 337 | 0.1246 |
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| 2022 | 52 | 451 | 0.1153 |
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| 2023 | 36 | 372 | 0.0968 |
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| 2024 | 143 | 474 | 0.3017 |
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| 2025 | 116 | 463 | 0.2505 |
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| 2026 | 25 | 145 | 0.1724 |
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### DENK
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| Year | Voor | Cast | Support Ratio |
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|------|------|------|---------------|
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| 2016 | 0 | 0 | N/A |
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| 2018 | 2 | 5 | 0.4000 |
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| 2019 | 68 | 175 | 0.3886 |
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| 2020 | 188 | 471 | 0.3992 |
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| 2021 | 238 | 428 | 0.5561 |
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| 2022 | 136 | 456 | 0.2982 |
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| 2023 | 137 | 378 | 0.3624 |
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| 2024 | 137 | 481 | 0.2848 |
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| 2025 | 125 | 490 | 0.2551 |
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| 2026 | 45 | 153 | 0.2941 |
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---
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## 6. Verdict
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**Left-wing response:** Left-wing opposition hardened modestly
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(Left support: 21.3% → 20.2%, Δ = -1.1%)
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**Centrist response:**
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**Centrist acceptance surged** (large increase in support)
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(Centrist support: 26.2% → 46.8%, Δ = +20.6%, d=+1.89)
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**Polarization gap trajectory:**
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Pre-2024 mean gap: 0.049
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Post-2024 mean gap: 0.266
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Delta: +0.217
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The polarization gap **widened** by +0.217, driven predominantly by the centrist acceptance surge rather than left-wing hardening.
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**Key finding:** The centrist acceptance surge is the dominant force.
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The polarization gap widened because centrist parties started supporting
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right-wing motions at much higher rates, while left parties simultaneously hardened their opposition. The centrist shift is
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18.3x larger in magnitude
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than the left-wing shift. Right-wing moderation (content extremity decline)
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likely contributed to both effects: making motions more palatable for
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centrists while simultaneously creating a strategic environment where
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left-wing parties feel more pressure to distinguish themselves through
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opposition.
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---
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## 7. Figure
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**Figure 1 (top):** Left-wing MP-level support and centrist (strict) support
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for right-wing motions, with per-party left trajectories.
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**Figure 1 (bottom):** Polarization gap (centrist support − left support).
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Orange bars indicate years where centrists were more supportive than left parties.
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Green bars indicate the opposite. The widening post-2024 reflects centrist acceptance.
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---
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## 8. Limitations
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- Left-party analysis aggregates GroenLinks, PvdA, and GroenLinks-PvdA under
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'GroenLinks-PvdA' after normalization (they merged in 2023). Pre-2023 values
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average the two separate parties' MPs.
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- Per-party support ratios are sensitive to small MP counts for small parties
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(PvdD, Volt, DENK) — a single MP changing vote can swing the ratio.
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- left_support_mp aggregates all left-party MPs together; party-level breakdown
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from raw mp_votes provides finer granularity but may differ slightly.
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- MP-weighted support ratios (left_support_mp) count individual MPs,
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whereas centrist_support_strict counts whole parties. This is intentional:
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left support is measured at the MP level because left-party discipline is
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looser than centrist-party discipline.
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