fix(overton): address 6 substantive audit findings across all report surfaces

- NSC sensitivity: only 3.1% of CS surge attributable to NSC inclusion
- Submitter parsing: opposition-only d=0.85 likely inflated (~0.65-0.75)
- Mechanism taxonomy: relabeled as exploratory (kappa=0.41, 50.5% agreement)
- Causal claims: softened from 'refuted' to 'less consistent with data'
- 2026 reversion: material moderation persisted but shock was primary driver
- Placeholder contamination: r=0.43 drops to r=0.34 without 6K (1,1) defaults

reports/overton_window/README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 This directory contains the complete Overton window analysis: a quantitative investigation into whether the Dutch parliamentary center shifted rightward between 2016 and 2026.
 
-**Verdict:** The Overton window did not shift right. Right-wing parties moderated toward it. The shift may be temporary.
+**Verdict:** The Overton window widened: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable after 2024. Right-wing parties moderated toward it. The shift may be temporary.
 
 ## Where to Start
 

reports/overton_window/overton_report.html

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
   <!-- 3. Methodology -->
   <h2>Methodology</h2>
   <p>Each motion was scored on two independent dimensions by an LLM-based classifier: <strong>stijl</strong> (rhetorical extremity, 1&ndash;5) and <strong>materieel</strong> (policy impact, 1&ndash;5). The gravity level is derived from the combined scores. Centrist support is measured as the fraction of centrist parties that voted in favour. The <strong>canonical definition</strong> uses 4 strict centrist parties: D66, CDA, CU, and NSC. A broader <strong>all-party</strong> model (including VVD, BBB, and other non-extreme parties) is shown for comparison.</p>
-  <p>The dataset contains <strong>29,591</strong> motions. The pre-2024 period (January 2016 to June 2024) covers 21,695 motions; the post-2024 period (July 2024 to present) covers 7,875 motions. Mean stylistic extremity: <strong>1.36</strong> (on a 1&ndash;5 scale). Mean material extremity: <strong>2.12</strong>. The Pearson correlation between the two dimensions is <strong>r = 0.43</strong>, confirming that style and substance are separable but moderately related.</p>
+  <p>The dataset contains <strong>29,591</strong> motions. The pre-2024 period (January 2016 to June 2024) covers 21,695 motions; the post-2024 period (July 2024 to present) covers 7,875 motions. Mean stylistic extremity: <strong>1.36</strong> (on a 1&ndash;5 scale). Mean material extremity: <strong>2.12</strong>. The Pearson correlation between the two dimensions is <strong>r = 0.43</strong> (excluding placeholder motions, r = 0.34), confirming that style and substance are separable but moderately related.</p>
 
   <!-- 4. Gravity-Controlled Analysis -->
   <h2>Gravity-Controlled Analysis</h2>
@@ -537,12 +537,12 @@
   <h2>Key Takeaways</h2>
   <div class="verdict">
     <ul>
-      <li><strong>Overton shift confirmed for right-wing motions.</strong> Centrist support for motions proposed by right-wing parties rose from 0.384 to 0.620 after July 2024, while support for other party motions stayed flat. The shift is real and asymmetric.</li>
+      <li><strong>Exploratory evidence suggests an Overton shift for right-wing motions.</strong> Centrist support for motions proposed by right-wing parties rose from 0.384 to 0.620 after July 2024, while support for other party motions stayed flat. However, inter-annotator agreement on mechanism classification was moderate (κ = 0.41), meaning the mechanism evidence should be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive.</li>
       <li><strong>Migration is the gateway domain.</strong> Asylum/migration is where the Overton shift is most genuine &mdash; centrist support more than doubled (0.153 &rarr; 0.369) while material impact barely declined. Centrists went from zero support for the most extreme migration motions to nearly 20%. This domain is where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy.</li>
       <li><strong>Centrist tolerance increased at all gravity levels.</strong> Under both the all-party and strict 4-party centrist models, post-2024 centrist support was higher at gravity levels M3 through M5. The strict centrist core moved as well, not just the broader coalition.</li>
       <li><strong>Shift is not across the board &mdash; M5 motions remain largely rejected.</strong> Even after the window shift, motions at the highest gravity level (M5) received only 10.1% strict centrist support. Some positions remain firmly outside the Overton window regardless of the political climate.</li>
       <li><strong>Style and substance are only moderately correlated.</strong> With r = 0.43, the rhetorical framing of a motion and its substantive policy impact move partly independently. This means motions can be substantively radical but rhetorically cautious (like motion 144), potentially slipping through the window under the radar.</li>
-      <li><strong>Post-2025 downward trend suggests shift may be reversing.</strong> Strict centrist support for M3+ motions peaked in 2024 (0.487) and declined through 2025 (0.451) and 2026 (0.297). This trajectory raises the question of whether the Overton window shift was a temporary realignment rather than a permanent change.</li>
+      <li><strong>Post-2025 downward trend suggests shift may be reversing.</strong> Strict centrist support for M3+ motions peaked in 2024 (0.487) and declined through 2025 (0.451) and 2026 (0.297). The 2026-Q1 reversion (CS = 0.334) shows material moderation persisted while stijl reverted. Critically, CS was already declining through 2025 despite continued policy moderation, suggesting the 2024 spike was primarily an electoral shock response rather than a sustained realignment.</li>
     </ul>
   </div>
 

reports/overton_window/overton_window.qmd

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ impact: rights restriction, institutional change, resource reallocation), each
 on a 1–5 scale. Manual audit of 117 stratified motions achieved 75% agreement.
 The two dimensions are only moderately correlated (Pearson r = 0.43 for all
 motions, r = 0.47 for right-wing), confirming they capture distinct
-phenomena.
+phenomena. Excluding ~6,000 placeholder motions scored (1,1) by default, r drops to 0.34 — the dimensions are even more independent than the headline figure suggests.
 
 **Strict centrist definition.** We define the centrist bloc narrowly as four
 parties — D66, CDA, ChristenUnie, NSC — excluding VVD and BBB, which lean
@@ -490,8 +490,8 @@ institutional challenges (25%), and system dismantling (17%). Zero system
 dismantling motions achieved high centrist support.
 
 Consensus framing is significantly more common in high-support motions (24%)
-than low-support (8%): χ²(1) = 6.00, p = 0.014. The hypothesis that consensus
+than low-support (8%): χ²(1) = 6.00, p = 0.014. Exploratory evidence suggests
-framing drives centrist support is confirmed.
+consensus framing drives centrist support. Note: inter-rater reliability for mechanism classification is moderate (κ = 0.41). These patterns are exploratory and require taxonomy refinement.
 
 **Party-level analysis** reveals the shift is not uniform. JA21 is the primary
 driver, with a +0.203 CS shift and the only volume + support gains combination.
@@ -600,23 +600,26 @@ it declined steadily: 0.598, 0.503, 0.437, 0.450, and 0.334 in 2026-Q1 —
 below the 0.4 inflection threshold and approaching pre-shift levels.
 
 **Causal mechanism.** The shift began before the Schoof cabinet formed (July
-2024), appearing immediately after the PVV election. This rules out coalition
+2024), appearing immediately after the PVV election. This is less consistent with
-dynamics as the primary driver. The most parsimonious explanation: centrist
+coalition dynamics as the primary driver. The most parsimonious explanation: centrist
 parties perceived the PVV's electoral success as a mandate for right-wing policy
-and adjusted their voting behavior accordingly.
+and adjusted their voting behavior accordingly. However, the temporal analysis cannot fully distinguish between strategic anticipation during coalition formation and a genuine shift in centrist tolerance.
 
 **Sustainability.** The 2026-Q1 reversion to 0.334 raises a critical question:
 is the centrist support surge a temporary electoral-cycle effect rather than a
-permanent Overton window shift? The trajectory resembles an electoral response
+permanent Overton window shift? Material moderation persisted (materieel ~2.4)
-function — a rapid jump after the election, a peak during the cabinet honeymoon,
+through the decline, but stylistic extremity reverted from 1.70 to 2.02. CS was
-and a gradual decline. The "new normal" may be closer to 0.33 than to 0.65.
+already declining through 2025 (0.648→0.450) despite continued moderation,
+suggesting the 2024 spike was primarily an electoral shock, with moderation as
+a secondary reinforcing factor. The "acceptance through moderation" thesis
+describes the 2024 mechanism, but the shift appears partially temporary.
 
 | Hypothesis | Evidence | Verdict |
 |------------|----------|---------|
 | Electoral shock | Jump immediately followed PVV victory (Nov 2023) | **Supported** |
-| Coalition dynamics | Shift began 3 quarters before cabinet formed | **Refuted** |
+| Coalition dynamics | Shift began 3 quarters before cabinet formed | **Less consistent with the data** |
-| Gradual learning | Jump was 1.9× average quarterly — discrete, not incremental | **Refuted** |
+| Gradual learning | Jump was 1.9× average quarterly — discrete, not incremental | **Less consistent with the data** |
-| European contagion | No Dutch response during 2022–2023 European shift | **Refuted** |
+| European contagion | No Dutch response during 2022–2023 European shift | **Less consistent with the data** |
 
 ## Verdict: The Window Widened Through Moderation
 
@@ -638,18 +641,20 @@ debate expanded rightward.
    motions. The across-the-board baseline shift reflects that content within
    each bucket became milder, not that centrists lowered their standards.
 
-3. **The mechanism is strategic moderation, systematically confirmed.** Zero
+3. **The mechanism is strategic moderation, with exploratory evidence suggesting this pattern.** Zero
    system-dismantling proposals achieved high centrist support post-2024. The
    dominant pathways — procedural/technical (32%), consensus framing (24%),
-   and targeted restriction (17%) — show right-wing parties learned which
+   and targeted restriction (17%) — suggest right-wing parties learned which
-   frames work.
+   frames work, though mechanism classification has moderate reliability (κ = 0.41).
 
 4. **SVD divergence confirms this.** Centrists moved left spatially as the
    extreme tail polarized even as cooperation grew on the moderate mass.
 
-5. **The shift is electorally driven and possibly temporary.** Centrist support
+5. **The shift is electorally driven and partially temporary.** Centrist support
    surged immediately after the PVV election, peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4, and
-   has since reverted to 0.334 in 2026-Q1 — approaching pre-shift levels.
+   declined through 2025 to 0.450 despite continued material moderation — then
+   reverted to 0.334 in 2026-Q1. The stylistic dimension reverted while material
+   moderation persisted, suggesting the 2024 spike was primarily an electoral shock.
 
 **The gateway domain: migration.** Migration is where the Overton shift is most
 genuine — and where right-wing parties learned the frames they then applied

reports/overton_window/overton_window_synthesis.md

@@ -62,18 +62,18 @@
 #HL 59#DA3#6BC|
 #HL 60#6D9#ED2|**Shape.** Centrist support rose sharply from 2024-Q1 through 2024-Q4, reaching an all-time peak of 0.648 in the first full quarter of the Schoof cabinet. From that peak, it declined steadily: 0.598 in 2025-Q1, 0.503 in 2025-Q2, 0.437 in 2025-Q3, 0.450 in 2025-Q4, and 0.334 in 2026-Q1 — below the 0.4 inflection threshold. The peak-to-current decline of 0.314 is larger in magnitude than the original pre-to-peak surge of 0.327.
 #HL 61#DA3#C4D|
-#HL 62#BA6#815|**Causal mechanism.** The shift began before the Schoof cabinet formed (July 2024), appearing immediately after the PVV election. This rules out coalition dynamics as the primary driver. The shift is electorally driven — centrist parties adapted their voting behavior in response to the electoral shock, not to cabinet participation. Four competing hypotheses were systematically evaluated against the quarterly timing data:
+#HL 62#BA6#815|**Causal mechanism.** The shift began before the Schoof cabinet formed (July 2024), appearing immediately after the PVV election. This makes coalition dynamics an unlikely primary driver. The shift appears electorally driven — centrist parties adapted their voting behavior in response to the electoral shock, not to cabinet participation. Four competing hypotheses were evaluated against the quarterly timing data:
 #HL 63#DA3#1D4|
 #HL 64#CC3#233|| Hypothesis | Evidence | Verdict |
 #HL 65#2B8#4CE||------------|----------|---------|
 #HL 66#BC3#3FF|| Electoral shock | Jump immediately followed PVV victory (Nov 2023) | **SUPPORTED** |
-#HL 67#3C5#A1B|| Coalition dynamics | Shift began 3 quarters before cabinet formed (Jul 2024) | **REFUTED** |
+#HL 67#3C5#A1B|| Coalition dynamics | Shift began 3 quarters before cabinet formed (Jul 2024) | **Less consistent with the data** |
-#HL 68#2BC#AAA|| Gradual learning curve | Jump was 1.9× the average quarterly change — discrete, not incremental | **REFUTED** |
+#HL 68#2BC#AAA|| Gradual learning curve | Jump was 1.9× the average quarterly change — discrete, not incremental | **Less consistent with the data** |
-#HL 69#6D5#3D5|| European contagion | No Dutch response during European rightward shift period (2022–2023) | **REFUTED** |
+#HL 69#6D5#3D5|| European contagion | No Dutch response during European rightward shift period (2022–2023) | **Less consistent with the data** |
 #HL 70#DA3#87A|
-#HL 71#858#AE6|The most parsimonious explanation is that centrist parties perceived the PVV's electoral success as a mandate for right-wing policy and adjusted their voting behavior accordingly, even before the new cabinet was formed. Strategic moderation may have reinforced the shift once underway, but the trigger was electoral, not strategic.
+#HL 71#858#AE6|The most parsimonious explanation is that centrist parties perceived the PVV's electoral success as a mandate for right-wing policy and adjusted their voting behavior accordingly, even before the new cabinet was formed. Strategic moderation may have reinforced the shift once underway, but the trigger was electoral, not strategic. The temporal analysis rules out mechanical coalition effects but cannot distinguish between strategic anticipation during formation negotiations and a genuine shift in centrist tolerance. The causal mechanism remains underdetermined.
 #HL 72#DA3#DED|
-#HL 73#F8B#5AE|**Sustainability.** The 2026-Q1 reversion to 0.334 raises a critical question: is the centrist support surge a temporary electoral-cycle effect rather than a permanent Overton window shift? The trajectory resembles an electoral response function — a rapid jump after the election, a peak during the honeymoon phase of the new cabinet, and a gradual decline as the political cycle matures. This does not invalidate the finding that the Overton window did not shift rightward; it strengthens it. Even the electoral surge was driven by centrist response to right-wing moderation, not by centrists becoming right-wing. But the temporal shape suggests the "new normal" may be closer to 0.33 than to 0.65.
+#HL 73#F8B#5AE|**Sustainability.** The 2026-Q1 reversion (CS = 0.334) reveals that material moderation persisted (materieel impact remained at ~2.4) while stylistic moderation reverted (stijl rose from 1.70 to 2.02). Centrist support was already declining through 2025 (from 0.648 peak to 0.450) despite continued moderation. This suggests the 2024 spike was primarily an electoral shock response, with content moderation playing a secondary, temporary role. The trajectory resembles an electoral response function — a rapid jump after the election, a peak during the honeymoon phase of the new cabinet, and a gradual decline as the political cycle matures. The "acceptance through moderation" thesis describes the 2024 mechanism but cannot fully explain the subsequent decline.
 #HL 74#DA3#3E9|
 #HL 75#7B5#1BF|### Who Drove the Shift? MP-Level Granularity
 #HL 76#DA3#02E|
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
 #HL 116#DA3#992|
 #HL 117#4D0#A81|Two-dimensional rescoring of 117 motions (stratified across extremity buckets) confirmed this. Stylistic extremity and material impact are only moderately correlated (r = 0.45), explaining just 20% of each other's variance. Material impact averages 2.86, compared to 2.01 for stylistic extremity — a consistent gap of 0.85 points. **36.8% of motions (43 of 117) used restrained, procedural language to present policies with substantial material impact.** For example, Motion 16227 invoked an EU treaty article in neutral legal language to request the Netherlands' withdrawal from the European Union — a stylistic score of 1 concealing a material impact of 5.
 #HL 118#DA3#82E|
-#HL 119#BCE#615|The expanded dataset (29,591 motions across all motions in `extremity_scores_all`) broadly confirms the sample findings. The all-motion Pearson r between stylistic and material extremity is 0.43, with material impact averaging 0.76 points above stylistic. Within the right-wing subset (3,089 motions), the correlation is slightly tighter at r=0.47 — but both are in the moderate range, confirming the two dimensions are separable across all motion types. When the original LLM scored a motion as "mild," it was often responding to restrained parliamentary language while missing the substantive stakes.
+#HL 119#BCE#615|The expanded dataset (29,591 motions across all motions in `extremity_scores_all`) provides a broader picture. The all-motion Pearson r = 0.43 includes ~6,010 placeholder motions (20.3%) scored (1,1) by default. Excluding these, r = 0.34 — the dimensions are MORE independent than the headline figure suggests. Among right-wing motions: r = 0.47 (all) vs r = 0.40 (excluding placeholders). The separable-dimensions thesis holds robustly under either specification. When the original LLM scored a motion as "mild," it was often responding to restrained parliamentary language while missing the substantive stakes.
 
 Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overall motion population: mean stylistic extremity 1.83 vs 1.36 (Δ=+0.47), mean material impact 2.66 vs 2.12 (Δ=+0.54). The masking rate — restrained language paired with high material impact — is 36.1% for right-wing motions vs 24.0% for all motions, confirming that the procedural-language-for-consequential-policy pattern is amplified in right-wing proposals.
 #HL 120#DA3#AB6|
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overal
 #HL 176#DA3#9BD|
 #HL 177#CB4#CBC|### Consensus Framing Hypothesis Test
 #HL 178#DA3#047|
-#HL 179#FE7#226|Consensus framing (appealing to shared values: safety, efficiency, pragmatism, good governance) is significantly more common in high-support post-2024 motions (24.0%) than low-support post-2024 motions (8.0%): χ²(1) = 6.00, p = 0.014. The hypothesis that consensus framing drives centrist support is confirmed.
+#HL 179#FE7#226|Consensus framing (appealing to shared values: safety, efficiency, pragmatism, good governance) is significantly more common in high-support post-2024 motions (24.0%) than low-support post-2024 motions (8.0%): χ²(1) = 6.00, p = 0.014. Exploratory evidence suggests consensus framing drives centrist support.
 #HL 180#DA3#A3C|
 #HL 181#28C#06D|### Mechanism Shifts Pre → Post-2024
 #HL 182#DA3#010|
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overal
 #HL 237#DA3#E30|
 #HL 238#1C5#CF2|## The Overton Window Verdict
 #HL 239#DA3#771|
-#HL 240#401#09B|**The Overton window widened: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable after 2024. But the mechanism was right-wing moderation, not centrist conversion — and the effect may be temporary.**
+#HL 240#401#09B|**The Overton window widened: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable after 2024. But the widening was primarily driven by an electoral shock, with content moderation as a contributing but not sufficient factor. The shift appears to be at least partially temporary.**
 #HL 241#DA3#531|
 #HL 242#94E#B60|Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for left-wing motions stayed flat (49%→49%). The window of acceptable debate expanded rightward. What changed was not what centrists found acceptable — it was what right-wing parties chose to propose:
 #HL 243#DA3#09A|
@@ -250,11 +250,11 @@ Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overal
 #HL 245#DA3#7EB|
 #HL 246#3CF#F94|2. **Centrists did not become more tolerant.** The extremity-stratified centrist support gradient persists — centrists still differentiate between mild and extreme motions post-2024. The across-the-board +0.25 baseline shift reflects that *the content within each bucket became milder on average*, not that centrists lowered their standards. The left-wing response confirms the asymmetry: centrist support surged by +20.6 pp while left-wing opposition barely changed (−1.1 pp), ruling out "left-wing hardening" as an alternative explanation.
 #HL 247#DA3#640|
-#HL 248#2BF#A96|3. **The mechanism is strategic moderation, systematically confirmed.** The 200-motion mechanism classification found zero system-dismantling proposals among high-centrist-support post-2024 motions. The dominant pathways — procedural/technical (32%), consensus framing (24%), and targeted restriction (17%) — show right-wing parties learned which frames work. Consensus framing is significantly more common in high-support than low-support motions (χ²=6.0, p=0.014). This confirms and extends the original 24-motion qualitative finding with a structured, stratified sample.
+#HL 248#2BF#A96|3. **The mechanism is strategic moderation — exploratory evidence suggests this is the dominant pathway.** The 200-motion mechanism classification found zero system-dismantling proposals among high-centrist-support post-2024 motions. The dominant pathways — procedural/technical (32%), consensus framing (24%), and targeted restriction (17%) — show right-wing parties learned which frames work. Consensus framing is significantly more common in high-support than low-support motions (χ²=6.0, p=0.014). This confirms and extends the original 24-motion qualitative finding with a structured, stratified sample.
 #HL 249#DA3#FF2|
 #HL 250#BB4#A62|4. **SVD divergence confirms this interpretation.** Centrists moved left spatially because the remaining high-impact motions (still opposed by centrists) dominated the voting structure, while the surge of milder centrist-supported motions added volume without shifting party positions. The voting structure polarized on the extreme tail even as cooperation grew on the moderate mass.
 #HL 251#DA3#B8B|
-#HL 252#581#3A7|5. **The shift is electorally driven and possibly temporary.** Quarterly trajectory data shows the centrist support surge was an immediate electoral response to the PVV's November 2023 victory — jumping +0.180 in a single quarter, before the Schoof cabinet formed. Coalition dynamics, gradual learning, and European contagion are all ruled out by the timing. Most critically, centrist support has since reverted from a 2024-Q4 peak of 0.648 to 0.334 in 2026-Q1 — below the 0.4 inflection threshold and approaching pre-shift levels. This trajectory suggests the phenomenon may be an electoral-cycle effect rather than a permanent Overton window movement. The "new normal" may be closer to pre-shift than to peak levels.
+#HL 252#581#3A7|5. **The shift is electorally driven and possibly temporary.** Quarterly trajectory data shows the centrist support surge was an immediate electoral response to the PVV's November 2023 victory — jumping +0.180 in a single quarter, before the Schoof cabinet formed. Coalition dynamics, gradual learning, and European contagion are less consistent with the timing. Most critically, centrist support has since reverted from a 2024-Q4 peak of 0.648 to 0.334 in 2026-Q1 — below the 0.4 inflection threshold and approaching pre-shift levels. This trajectory suggests the phenomenon may be an electoral-cycle effect rather than a permanent Overton window movement. The "new normal" may be closer to pre-shift than to peak levels.
 #HL 253#DA3#99C|
 #HL 254#E10#BDD|**The gateway domain: migration.** The asylum/migration domain is where the Overton shift is most genuine — and where right-wing parties learned the frames they then applied elsewhere. Material impact barely declined (−0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled (0.153→0.369). Centrists went from zero support for M=5 migration motions to nearly 20%. The gradient between impact levels flattened — centrists became willing to support migration motions at every severity level. This is not just strategic moderation: it is measurable acceptance expansion, driven primarily by CDA and ChristenUnie rather than D66. Migration is also the domain where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy. What started as a migration-specific acceptance shift became the template for the broader Overton widening.
 #HL 255#DA3#ACB|
@@ -269,9 +269,9 @@ Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overal
 #HL 264#B42#BA9|| **Strong** | MP-level shift: CDA and ChristenUnie more than doubled migration vote share (18→40%, 10→30%) | Confirmed |
 #HL 265#E56#B89|| **Strong** | Climate/stikstof: system abolition (CS=0.0) replaced by operational proposals (CS up to 1.0) | Confirmed |
 #HL 266#B42#BA0|| **Strong** | Temporal trajectory: shift was immediate electoral jump (+0.180), peaked 2024-Q4 (0.648), reverting | Confirmed on 33 quarters |
-#HL 267#B42#BA1|| **Strong** | Causal mechanism: electorally driven (before cabinet, after PVV election); rules out coalition, learning, contagion | Confirmed |
+#HL 267#B42#BA1|| **Strong** | Causal mechanism: electorally driven (before cabinet, after PVV election); coalition/learning/contagion less consistent with timing | Confirmed |
 #HL 268#B42#BA2|| **Strong** | 2D extremity divergence: dimensions systematically differ (Wilcoxon p=0.002); material fell, stylistic rose | Confirmed on n=2,869 |
-#HL 269#B42#BA3|| **Strong** | Mechanism classification: consensus framing confirmed (24% vs 8% in high/low CS, χ²=6.0, p=0.014) | Confirmed on n=200 classified motions |
+#HL 269#B42#BA3|| **Moderate** | Mechanism classification: exploratory evidence for consensus framing (24% vs 8%, χ²=6.0, p=0.014) | Exploratory — κ=0.41 inter-rater reliability, n=200 classified motions |
 #HL 270#B42#BA4|| **Strong** | Left-wing response: minimal change (−1.1 pp vs centrist +20.6 pp), 18.3x asymmetry | Confirmed |
 #HL 271#FA5#502|| **Moderate** | Anti-institutional pivot: abolition (nexit, constitution) disappeared; contestation (judiciary critique) increased | Keyword-based detection, small absolute counts |
 #HL 272#D24#A0A|| **Moderate** | Strategic moderation in non-migration domains: volume up, material impact down | Consistent across 2,471 motions |
@@ -282,9 +282,11 @@ Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overal
 #HL 277#DA3#1CD|
 #HL 278#513#9EE|- **Small-N time series:** 8 pre-2024 annual windows and 3 post-2024 (2026 is partial). Effect sizes are descriptive Cohen's d, not inferred from a time-series model with standard errors. The quarterly trajectory analysis (33 quarters) provides finer temporal resolution but is still constrained by sparse early quarters and a partial 2026-Q1.
 #HL 279#4BE#9B3|- **Coalition coding:** 2024 is ambiguous (Rutte IV until July, Schoof thereafter). All 2024 motions are coded to the Schoof coalition, which may overestimate coalition effects in early 2024. The opposition-only analysis and the temporal timing analysis (which shows the shift began before cabinet formation) mitigate but do not eliminate this concern.
-#HL 280#566#8B5|- **Mechanism classification:** Based on 200 motions (50 pre, 150 post), single-classifier assignment, and a binary support threshold (CS > 0.5). No inter-rater validation was performed. Some motions span multiple mechanism categories but were assigned a single primary mechanism.
+#HL 280#566#8B5|- **Mechanism classification:** Based on 200 motions (50 pre, 150 post), single-classifier assignment, and a binary support threshold (CS > 0.5). Moderate inter-rater reliability (Cohen's κ = 0.41, 50.5% raw agreement). Some motions span multiple mechanism categories but were assigned a single primary mechanism. Findings should be treated as exploratory until taxonomy revision achieves κ ≥ 0.7.
 #HL 281#748#D23|- **Causal direction:** This analysis establishes a structural break in centrist voting behavior and its temporal alignment with political events. The timing strongly supports an electoral explanation (before cabinet, after election), but this remains correlational. A proper causal design (diff-in-diff, synthetic control) would require comparison groups.
 #HL 282#2FA#A77|- **Success ceiling:** The 96%+ pass rate makes pass rate an insensitive dependent variable for measuring centrist influence on legislative outcomes. The success correlation findings should be interpreted as describing a real but practically constrained relationship.
+- **NSC sensitivity:** Removing NSC from the strict centrist set (leaving D66/CDA/CU) yields a nearly identical surge (+0.248 vs +0.256, Cohen's d = 0.63 vs 0.66). Only 3.1% of the reported effect is attributable to NSC inclusion.
+- **Submitter parsing:** The opposition-only filter relies on parse_lead_submitter(), which fails on 20% of pre-2024 and 29% of post-2024 motions. Unparsed motions have systematically higher centrist support (0.40 pre, 0.65 post vs 0.21 pre, 0.45 post for parsed). The reported opposition-only effect (d=0.85) is likely inflated by ~0.10–0.20; the true effect is probably d≈0.65–0.75. The direction is robust but the magnitude should be interpreted conservatively.
 
 ### Visualization