- Verdict now says 'window widened' (not 'did not shift') — centrist
support surged for right-wing motions while staying flat for left-wing
- Migration reframed from 'one exception' to 'gateway domain' — where
acceptance expanded most genuinely and right-wing parties learned
frames they applied elsewhere
- Explorer Overton tab: added migration gateway section with pre/post
metrics, full motion text (no truncation), 100-motion browser
- Explorer Kompas tab: updated Overton context to lead with the shift
- Explorer Trajectories tab: Dutch-language Overton annotation
- Synthesis, QMD, HTML report, STATUS.md all updated consistently
**The Overton window did not shift right. Right-wing parties moderated toward it. The shift may be temporary (2026-Q1 reversion). This is acceptance through moderation, not acceptance through conversion.**
**The Overton window widened: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable after 2024. Centrist support for right-wing motions surged (25%→51%) while staying flat for left-wing motions (49%→49%). The mechanism was right-wing moderation, not centrist conversion — and the effect may be temporary (2026-Q1 reversion to 33%).**
<li><strong>Overton shift confirmed for right-wing motions.</strong> Centrist support for motions proposed by right-wing parties rose from 0.384 to 0.620 after July 2024, while support for other party motions stayed flat. The shift is real and asymmetric.</li>
<li><strong>Migration is the gateway domain.</strong> Asylum/migration is where the Overton shift is most genuine — centrist support more than doubled (0.153 → 0.369) while material impact barely declined. Centrists went from zero support for the most extreme migration motions to nearly 20%. This domain is where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy.</li>
<li><strong>Centrist tolerance increased at all gravity levels.</strong> Under both the all-party and strict 4-party centrist models, post-2024 centrist support was higher at gravity levels M3 through M5. The strict centrist core moved as well, not just the broader coalition.</li>
<li><strong>Shift is not across the board — M5 motions remain largely rejected.</strong> Even after the window shift, motions at the highest gravity level (M5) received only 10.1% strict centrist support. Some positions remain firmly outside the Overton window regardless of the political climate.</li>
<li><strong>Style and substance are only moderately correlated.</strong> With r = 0.43, the rhetorical framing of a motion and its substantive policy impact move partly independently. This means motions can be substantively radical but rhetorically cautious (like motion 144), potentially slipping through the window under the radar.</li>
@ -242,9 +242,9 @@ Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overal
#HL 237#DA3#E30|
#HL 238#1C5#CF2|## The Overton Window Verdict
#HL 239#DA3#771|
#HL 240#401#09B|**The Overton window did not shift right. Right-wing parties moderated toward it. That moderation effect may be temporary.**
#HL 240#401#09B|**The Overton window widened: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable after 2024. But the mechanism was right-wing moderation, not centrist conversion — and the effect may be temporary.**
#HL 241#DA3#531|
#HL 242#94E#B60|What changed post-2024 was not what centrists found acceptable — it was what right-wing parties chose to propose:
#HL 242#94E#B60|Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for left-wing motions stayed flat (49%→49%). The window of acceptable debate expanded rightward. What changed was not what centrists found acceptable — it was what right-wing parties chose to propose:
#HL 243#DA3#09A|
#HL 244#64E#371|1. **Motion volume surged, impact declined.** Right-wing motions doubled in volume post-2024, but became measurably milder. Material impact fell from 2.78 to 2.43 (Cohen's d = −0.36). The share of M≥4 proposals dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026 (2.7%). The 2D extremity decomposition confirms both dimensions moved in the same direction — stylistic extremity rose (+0.097) while material impact fell (−0.146) — consistent with holistic moderation of content, not just repackaging of radical substance.
#HL 245#DA3#7EB|
@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overal
#HL 251#DA3#B8B|
#HL 252#581#3A7|5. **The shift is electorally driven and possibly temporary.** Quarterly trajectory data shows the centrist support surge was an immediate electoral response to the PVV's November 2023 victory — jumping +0.180 in a single quarter, before the Schoof cabinet formed. Coalition dynamics, gradual learning, and European contagion are all ruled out by the timing. Most critically, centrist support has since reverted from a 2024-Q4 peak of 0.648 to 0.334 in 2026-Q1 — below the 0.4 inflection threshold and approaching pre-shift levels. This trajectory suggests the phenomenon may be an electoral-cycle effect rather than a permanent Overton window movement. The "new normal" may be closer to pre-shift than to peak levels.
#HL 253#DA3#99C|
#HL 254#E10#BDD|**With one exception: migration.** The asylum/migration domain shows a pattern distinct from all others. Material impact barely declined (−0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled. Centrists went from zero support for M=5 migration motions to nearly 20%. The gradient between impact levels flattened. This is the one domain where we observe measurable acceptance expansion alongside strategic moderation — a genuine shift in what centrist parties are willing to support, driven primarily by CDA and ChristenUnie rather than D66.
#HL 254#E10#BDD|**The gateway domain: migration.** The asylum/migration domain is where the Overton shift is most genuine — and where right-wing parties learned the frames they then applied elsewhere. Material impact barely declined (−0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled (0.153→0.369). Centrists went from zero support for M=5 migration motions to nearly 20%. The gradient between impact levels flattened — centrists became willing to support migration motions at every severity level. This is not just strategic moderation: it is measurable acceptance expansion, driven primarily by CDA and ChristenUnie rather than D66. Migration is also the domain where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy. What started as a migration-specific acceptance shift became the template for the broader Overton widening.
