fix(overton): correct 3 critical data errors and 3 high-severity caveats

CRIT-1: Stylistic extremity direction reversed — both dimensions declined
  (stijl 1.875→1.744, not increased +0.097). Holistic moderation, not divergence.
CRIT-2: Masking rate corrected from 36.1% to 9.7% (S≤2, M≥4 on full dataset).
  Original 36.8% was from 117-motion manual audit, not extrapolatable.
CRIT-3: Material impact values harmonized to motion-level means (2.79→2.45).
  Old values (2.78→2.43) used undisclosed mean-of-yearly-means aggregation.
HIGH-1: Migration domain provenance caveat — category column is NULL,
  analysis relies on title keyword matching (approximate boundaries).
HIGH-2: 2026-Q2 bounce caveat — n=44, bimodal distribution, sensitive to
  composition (many consensus defense motions among CS=1.0 items).
HIGH-3: Non-right-wing control group corrected — CS rose 58%→62% (+3.5pp),
  not 'flat at 49%'. Surge was disproportionate for right-wing content.

Also: fixed 6-party centrist definition (line 30) to 4-party,
removed 'did not shift rightward' phrasing, added Phase 4 synthesis
reminder to build_all_reports.py.

analysis/right_wing/build_all_reports.py

@@ -190,6 +190,18 @@ def main() -> int:
     else:
         logger.info("Skipping LLM-dependent phase (--skip-llm).")
 
+    # Phase 4: Synthesis reminder (manual)
+    print("\n" + "=" * 50)
+    print("PHASE 4 — MANUAL STEP REQUIRED")
+    print("=" * 50)
+    print("  After all scripts complete, manually update:")
+    print("    - reports/overton_window/overton_window_synthesis.md")
+    print("    - reports/overton_window/overton_window.qmd (then: quarto render)")
+    print("    - reports/overton_window/overton_report.html")
+    print("  These narrative files require human judgment to integrate")
+    print("  new data into the existing analysis framework.")
+    print("=" * 50)
+
     total_elapsed = time.perf_counter() - t_start
 
     # Summary

reports/overton_window/overton_report.html

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
 
   <!-- 4. Gravity-Controlled Analysis -->
   <h2>Gravity-Controlled Analysis</h2>
-  <p>Centrist support (all-party definition) by gravity level, before and after July 2024. As expected, higher gravity levels show lower centrist support. The post-2024 window shows increased centrist support at levels M3 and above, consistent with a rightward shift in the Overton window.</p>
+  <p>Centrist support (all-party definition) by gravity level, before and after July 2024. As expected, higher gravity levels show lower centrist support. The post-2024 window shows increased centrist support at levels M3 and above, consistent with a widening of the Overton window.</p>
 
   <div class="chart-block">
     <div class="bar-legend">

reports/overton_window/overton_window.qmd

@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ The data tells a different story.
 Using 29,591 Tweede Kamer motions with full MP-level vote records, Procrustes-aligned
 SVD spatial analysis, and 2D extremity scoring (stijl-extremiteit vs materiële
 impact), we find that **the Overton window widened**: centrist support for
-right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for left-wing
+right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for non-right-wing
-motions stayed flat at 49%. What changed was the behavior of right-wing parties:
+motions rose modestly (58%→62%, +3.5 pp). What changed was the behavior of right-wing parties:
 they filed more motions, with milder content, framed in centrist-friendly
 language. Centrist voting support surged from 0.251 to 0.507 (Cohen's d = +0.65),
 but centrists did not become more right-wing — they stayed ideologically left
@@ -409,20 +409,20 @@ fig4.show()
 
 | Dimension | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ |
 |-----------|--------------|---------------|-----|
-| Stylistic extremity | 1.718 | 1.815 | +0.097 |
+| Stylistic extremity | 1.875 | 1.744 | −0.131 |
-| Material impact | 2.530 | 2.384 | −0.146 |
+| Material impact | 2.786 | 2.450 | −0.336 |
-| Gap (M−S) | 0.813 | 0.570 | −0.243 |
+| Gap (M−S) | 0.911 | 0.706 | −0.205 |
 
-Material impact *decreased* (−0.146) while stylistic extremity *increased*
+Both dimensions *decreased*: stylistic extremity (−0.131) and material impact
-(+0.097). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing yearly mean stylistic vs yearly
+(−0.336). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing yearly mean stylistic vs yearly
 mean material scores confirms the dimensions systematically differ (W = 0.0,
 n = 10 yearly pairs, p = 0.002). The gap between the two dimensions narrowed
-from 0.813 to 0.570 — right-wing motions became both less rhetorically hostile
+from 0.911 to 0.706 — right-wing motions became both less rhetorically hostile
 AND less substantively impactful.
 
 Compared to all motions, right-wing motions score higher on both dimensions:
 stijl +0.47, materieel +0.54. The masking rate — restrained language paired
-with high material impact (S ≤ 2, M ≥ 3) — is 36.1% for right-wing motions
+with high material impact — is 9.7% (S≤2, M≥4) or 13.5% (S=1, M≥3) for right-wing motions
 vs 24.0% for all motions. Right-wing proposals disproportionately use
 procedural language to advance consequential policy.
 
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ is the centrist support surge a temporary electoral-cycle effect rather than a
 permanent Overton window shift? Material moderation persisted (materieel ~2.4)
 through the decline, but stylistic extremity reverted from 1.70 to 2.02. CS was
 already declining through 2025 (0.648→0.450) despite continued moderation,
-suggesting the 2024 spike was primarily an electoral shock for non-migration domains. However, 2026-Q2 shows CS bouncing back to 0.523, driven by the intensifying migration debate. Migration centrist support (0.395) now exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time — the shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration, durable for migration.
+suggesting the 2024 spike was primarily an electoral shock for non-migration domains. However, 2026-Q2 shows CS bouncing back to 0.523 (n=44, interpret cautiously), driven by the intensifying migration debate. Migration centrist support (0.395) now exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time — the shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration, durable for migration.
 
 | Hypothesis | Evidence | Verdict |
 |------------|----------|---------|
@@ -626,11 +626,11 @@ acceptable after 2024. But the mechanism was right-wing moderation, not centrist
 conversion — and the effect may be temporary.**
 
 Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist
-support for left-wing motions stayed flat (49%→49%). The window of acceptable
+support for non-right-wing motions rose modestly (58%→62%, +3.5 pp). The window of acceptable
 debate expanded rightward.
 
 1. **Volume surged, impact declined.** Right-wing motions doubled in volume
-   post-2024, but material impact fell from 2.78 to 2.43 (Cohen's d = −0.36).
+   post-2024, but material impact fell from 2.79 to 2.45 (Cohen's d = −0.36).
    The M ≥ 4 share dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling to 2.7%
    by 2026.
 
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ debate expanded rightward.
 5. **The shift is electorally driven and domain-specific.** Centrist support
    surged immediately after the PVV election, peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4, and
    declined through 2025 to 0.450 despite continued material moderation — then
-   hit 0.334 in 2026-Q1. But 2026-Q2 bounced back to 0.523, driven by the
+   hit 0.334 in 2026-Q1. But 2026-Q2 bounced back to 0.523 (n=44, interpret cautiously), driven by the
    intensifying migration debate. Non-migration acceptance was a temporary
    electoral shock; migration acceptance is durable and growing.
 

reports/overton_window/overton_window_synthesis.md

@@ -11,15 +11,15 @@
 | Indicator | Pre-2024 | Post-2024 | Δ | Verdict |
 |-----------|----------|-----------|---|--------|
 | Centrist support (strict) | 0.251 | 0.507 | +0.256 | **Surged** |
-| Material impact (2D) | 2.78 | 2.43 | −0.35 | **Declined** |
+| Material impact (2D) | 2.79 | 2.45 | −0.34 | **Declined** |
 | M≥4 share (% high-impact) | 23.7% | 11.3% | −12.4 pp | **Declined** |
 | SVD cultural gap (centrist−right) | 0.282 | 0.428 | +0.146 | **Diverged** |
-| Stylistic extremity (2D) | 1.718 | 1.815 | +0.097 | **Increased** |
+| Stylistic extremity (2D) | 1.875 | 1.744 | −0.131 | **Declined** |
 | Temporal trajectory | — | — | — | **Immediate electoral jump, reverting** |
 
-Centrist support surged. Centrist parties moved *left* spatially while voting *more* with right-wing motions. But the motions themselves became *less* materially impactful — the share of high-impact proposals (M≥4) dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026 (2.7%). The Overton window did **not** shift rightward. Instead, right-wing parties shifted their strategy toward the window: they filed more motions, with milder content, framed in centrist-friendly language. The center rewarded the framing without moving.
+Centrist support surged. Centrist parties moved *left* spatially while voting *more* with right-wing motions. But the motions themselves became *less* materially impactful — the share of high-impact proposals (M≥4) dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026 (2.7%). The Overton window **widened**: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable. Right-wing parties shifted their strategy toward the window: they filed more motions, with milder content, framed in centrist-friendly language. The center rewarded the framing without moving ideologically.
 
-Two additional findings deepen the picture. First, the single-dimension extremity trend masks a **2D divergence**: stylistic extremity *rose* (+0.097) while material impact *fell* (−0.146). Right-wing motions became more restrained in language while becoming less materially consequential — a strategic shift, not random noise. Second, the temporal trajectory reveals the shift was an **immediate electoral jump** (+0.180 in a single quarter) that peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4 and has since **reverted** to 0.334 by 2026-Q1. The shift may be an electoral-cycle phenomenon rather than a permanent Overton window movement.
+Two additional findings deepen the picture. First, the 2D extremity decomposition shows **both dimensions declined**: stylistic extremity fell (−0.131) alongside material impact (−0.35). Right-wing motions became less rhetorically hostile AND less materially consequential — a holistic moderation strategy, not just surface-level repackaging. Second, the temporal trajectory reveals the shift was an **immediate electoral jump** (+0.180 in a single quarter) that peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4 and has since **reverted** to 0.334 by 2026-Q1. The shift may be an electoral-cycle phenomenon rather than a permanent Overton window movement.
 
 This is **acceptance through moderation**, not acceptance through conversion. Right-wing influence grew by becoming more centrist-compatible, not by making centrists more right-wing.
 
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This is **acceptance through moderation**, not acceptance through conversion. Ri
 
 ## Indicator 1: Centrist Voting Support
 
-The cleanest signal is in how centrist parties voted on right-wing motions. Using a strict centrist definition (VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU), average support rose from 0.251 pre-2024 to 0.507 post-2024 — a Cohen's d of +0.65, representing a medium-to-large effect in descriptive terms. The breakpoint is unmistakably 2024.
+The cleanest signal is in how centrist parties voted on right-wing motions. Using a strict centrist definition (D66, CDA, CU, NSC), average support rose from 0.251 pre-2024 to 0.507 post-2024 — a Cohen's d of +0.65, representing a medium-to-large effect in descriptive terms. The breakpoint is unmistakably 2024.
 
 This is not a coalition artifact. After the Schoof cabinet formed in July 2024, PVV entered government, which could mechanically inflate support for its own motions. So we restricted the analysis to opposition-only right-wing motions (those submitted by parties outside the governing coalition). The effect there is larger: d = +0.85, with support jumping from 0.270 to 0.543. If anything, coalition dynamics slightly suppressed the observable shift. Centrist parties are genuinely more willing to support right-wing motions than they were before 2024, even when those motions come from opposition right-wing parties.
 
@@ -114,25 +114,25 @@ The original single-dimensional extremity score showed no increase post-2024 (d
 
 The answer lies in what the single score measured. A manual audit of 20 motions achieved 75% agreement with the LLM scores — above the 70% threshold but borderline. The audit identified systematic biases: the LLM overrated anti-institutional language, migration-adjacent topics, and climate motions. It was sensitive to stylistic hostility, not material policy impact.
 
-Two-dimensional rescoring of 117 motions (stratified across extremity buckets) confirmed this. Stylistic extremity and material impact are only moderately correlated (r = 0.45), explaining just 20% of each other's variance. Material impact averages 2.86, compared to 2.01 for stylistic extremity — a consistent gap of 0.85 points. **36.8% of motions (43 of 117) used restrained, procedural language to present policies with substantial material impact.** For example, Motion 16227 invoked an EU treaty article in neutral legal language to request the Netherlands' withdrawal from the European Union — a stylistic score of 1 concealing a material impact of 5.
+Two-dimensional rescoring of 117 motions (stratified across extremity buckets) confirmed this. Stylistic extremity and material impact are only moderately correlated (r = 0.45), explaining just 20% of each other's variance. Material impact averages 2.86, compared to 2.01 for stylistic extremity — a consistent gap of 0.85 points. A manual audit of these 117 motions found that 43 (36.8%) used restrained, procedural language to present policies with substantial material impact. For example, Motion 16227 invoked an EU treaty article in neutral legal language to request the Netherlands' withdrawal from the European Union — a stylistic score of 1 concealing a material impact of 5. In the full dataset (3,030 right-wing motions), the masking rate (S≤2, M≥4) is 9.7%.
 
 The expanded dataset (29,591 motions across all motions in `extremity_scores_all`) provides a broader picture. The all-motion Pearson r = 0.43 includes ~6,010 placeholder motions (20.3%) scored (1,1) by default. Excluding these, r = 0.34 — the dimensions are MORE independent than the headline figure suggests. Among right-wing motions: r = 0.47 (all) vs r = 0.40 (excluding placeholders). The separable-dimensions thesis holds robustly under either specification. When the original LLM scored a motion as "mild," it was often responding to restrained parliamentary language while missing the substantive stakes.
 
-Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overall motion population: mean stylistic extremity 1.83 vs 1.36 (Δ=+0.47), mean material impact 2.66 vs 2.12 (Δ=+0.54). The masking rate — restrained language paired with high material impact — is 36.1% for right-wing motions vs 24.0% for all motions, confirming that the procedural-language-for-consequential-policy pattern is amplified in right-wing proposals.
+Right-wing motions score significantly higher on both dimensions than the overall motion population: mean stylistic extremity 1.83 vs 1.36 (Δ=+0.47), mean material impact 2.66 vs 2.12 (Δ=+0.54). The masking rate — restrained language (S≤2) paired with high material impact (M≥4) — is 9.7% for right-wing motions vs 3.5% for all motions, confirming that the procedural-language-for-consequential-policy pattern is amplified in right-wing proposals. A broader definition (S=1, M≥3) yields 13.5% for right-wing motions.
 
 ### 2D Extremity Trajectories
 
-The single-dimension trend conceals diverging trajectories when stylistic and material extremity are tracked separately over time (2016–2026, n=2,869 scored motions). The two dimensions are significantly decoupled: right-wing correlation r=0.47 (p<0.001), all-motion r=0.43, leaving 78–82% of variance unexplained.
+The single-dimension trend is clarified when stylistic and material extremity are tracked separately over time (2016–2026, n=3,030 scored right-wing motions). The two dimensions are only moderately correlated: right-wing r=0.47 (p<0.001), all-motion r=0.43, leaving 78–82% of variance unexplained.
 
 | Dimension | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ |
 |-----------|--------------|---------------|-----|
-| Stylistic extremity | 1.718 | 1.815 | +0.097 |
+| Stylistic extremity | 1.875 | 1.744 | −0.131 |
-| Material impact | 2.530 | 2.384 | −0.146 |
+| Material impact | 2.786 | 2.450 | −0.336 |
-| Gap (M−S) | 0.813 | 0.570 | −0.243 |
+| Gap (M−S) | 0.911 | 0.706 | −0.205 |
 
-Material impact *decreased* (−0.146) while stylistic extremity *increased* (+0.097). This is the opposite of what strategic rhetorical moderation would predict if it were purely a surface-level rebranding. Instead, right-wing motions became more restrained in language while simultaneously becoming less materially consequential. The gap between the two dimensions narrowed from 0.813 to 0.570, indicating the dimensions are converging — the distinctiveness of "high-impact but restrained" motions is declining.
+**Both dimensions declined** post-2024. Material impact fell more sharply (−0.336) than stylistic extremity (−0.131), indicating right-wing parties moderated both their language and their policy ambitions — but moderated substance more than style. The gap between the two dimensions narrowed from 0.911 to 0.706, meaning the distinctive pattern of "high-impact but restrained language" motions became less pronounced.
 
-A Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing yearly mean stylistic vs yearly mean material scores confirms the dimensions systematically differ (W=0.0, n=10 yearly pairs, p=0.002). This is not random noise — the two dimensions genuinely diverge, and the flat single-dimension trend masks this structure.
+A Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing yearly mean stylistic vs yearly mean material scores confirms the dimensions systematically differ in magnitude (W=0.0, n=10 yearly pairs, p=0.002). Material impact consistently exceeds stylistic extremity, and the gap narrowed post-2024.
 
 Domain-stratified analysis reveals the same pattern in both migration and non-migration motions. In migration, stylistic scores dropped from 2.70 to 2.51 while material declined from 3.27 to 3.04 — both falling, with style falling faster. In non-migration, stylistic scores remained essentially flat (1.65→1.69) while material fell substantially (2.48→2.25). The per-year correlation between stylistic and material scores did not significantly change (Mann-Whitney U=9.0, p=0.79), suggesting the two dimensions have been consistently only moderately correlated throughout the entire period — this is not a new phenomenon triggered by the 2024 shift.
 
@@ -241,9 +241,9 @@ The ceiling effect is the dominant methodological reality: when 96%+ of motions
 
 **The Overton window widened: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable after 2024. The widening was primarily driven by an electoral shock, with content moderation as a contributing factor. The shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration domains, but durable and growing for migration.**
 
-Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for left-wing motions stayed flat (49%→49%). The window of acceptable debate expanded rightward. What changed was not what centrists found acceptable — it was what right-wing parties chose to propose:
+Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for non-right-wing motions rose only modestly (58%→62%, +3.5 pp). The window of acceptable debate expanded disproportionately for right-wing content. What changed was not what centrists found acceptable — it was what right-wing parties chose to propose:
 
-1. **Motion volume surged, impact declined.** Right-wing motions doubled in volume post-2024, but became measurably milder. Material impact fell from 2.78 to 2.43 (Cohen's d = −0.36). The share of M≥4 proposals dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026 (2.7%). The 2D extremity decomposition confirms both dimensions moved in the same direction — stylistic extremity rose (+0.097) while material impact fell (−0.146) — consistent with holistic moderation of content, not just repackaging of radical substance.
+1. **Motion volume surged, impact declined.** Right-wing motions doubled in volume post-2024, but became measurably milder. Material impact fell from 2.79 to 2.45 (motion-level means). The share of M≥4 proposals dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026. The 2D extremity decomposition confirms both dimensions declined — stylistic extremity fell (1.875→1.744) alongside material impact — consistent with holistic moderation of content, not just repackaging of radical substance.
 
 2. **Centrists did not become more tolerant.** The extremity-stratified centrist support gradient persists — centrists still differentiate between mild and extreme motions post-2024. The across-the-board +0.25 baseline shift reflects that *the content within each bucket became milder on average*, not that centrists lowered their standards. The left-wing response confirms the asymmetry: centrist support surged by +20.6 pp while left-wing opposition barely changed (−1.1 pp), ruling out "left-wing hardening" as an alternative explanation.
 
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist s
 
 4. **SVD divergence confirms this interpretation.** Centrists moved left spatially because the remaining high-impact motions (still opposed by centrists) dominated the voting structure, while the surge of milder centrist-supported motions added volume without shifting party positions. The voting structure polarized on the extreme tail even as cooperation grew on the moderate mass.
 
-5. **The shift is electorally driven and domain-specific.** Quarterly trajectory data shows the centrist support surge was an immediate electoral response to the PVV's November 2023 victory — jumping +0.180 in a single quarter, before the Schoof cabinet formed. Coalition dynamics, gradual learning, and European contagion are less consistent with the timing. Centrist support peaked at 0.648 (2024-Q4), declined through 2025, and hit 0.334 in 2026-Q1 — suggesting an electoral-cycle effect. However, 2026-Q2 shows a significant bounce to 0.523, driven by the intensifying migration debate. The reversion was real for non-migration domains (where the shock response faded), but migration acceptance has become self-sustaining and is now the dominant driver of continued Overton widening.
+5. **The shift is electorally driven and domain-specific.** Quarterly trajectory data shows the centrist support surge was an immediate electoral response to the PVV's November 2023 victory — jumping +0.180 in a single quarter, before the Schoof cabinet formed. Coalition dynamics, gradual learning, and European contagion are less consistent with the timing. Centrist support peaked at 0.648 (2024-Q4), declined through 2025, and hit 0.334 in 2026-Q1 — suggesting an electoral-cycle effect. However, 2026-Q2 shows a bounce to 0.523 (n=44, bimodal distribution — interpret cautiously), driven partly by the intensifying migration debate. The reversion was real for non-migration domains (where the shock response faded), but migration acceptance has become self-sustaining and is now the dominant driver of continued Overton widening.
 
 **The gateway domain: migration.** The asylum/migration domain is where the Overton shift is most genuine — and where right-wing parties learned the frames they then applied elsewhere. Material impact barely declined (−0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled (0.153→0.369). Centrists went from zero support for M=5 migration motions to nearly 20%. The gradient between impact levels flattened — centrists became willing to support migration motions at every severity level. This is not just strategic moderation: it is measurable acceptance expansion, driven primarily by CDA and ChristenUnie rather than D66. Migration is also the domain where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy. What started as a migration-specific acceptance shift became the template for the broader Overton widening. **As of 2026, migration centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time** — a structural reversal confirming that migration acceptance is durable and growing while non-migration acceptance was the temporary electoral shock response. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received unanimous centrist support (CS=1.00), including high-impact items, as the Dutch migration debate intensified.
 
@@ -260,20 +260,20 @@ Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist s
 | Level | Finding | Status |
 |-------|---------|--------|
 | **Strong** | Centrist voting support surged (d = +0.65 strict, d = +0.85 opposition-only) | Confirmed |
-| **Strong** | Material impact of right-wing motions *declined* post-2024 (2.78→2.43, M≥4 share: 23.7%→11.3%) | Confirmed on n=2,850 |
+| **Strong** | Material impact of right-wing motions *declined* post-2024 (2.79→2.45 motion-level, M≥4 share: 23.7%→11.3%) | Confirmed on n=3,030 |
 | **Strong** | SVD spatial divergence — centrists moved left, right moved further right | Confirmed |
 | **Strong** | Migration domain: centrist M=5 support went from 0.0 to 0.185 — acceptance expansion | Confirmed on n=379 migration motions |
 | **Strong** | MP-level shift: CDA and ChristenUnie more than doubled migration vote share (18→40%, 10→30%) | Confirmed |
 | **Strong** | Climate/stikstof: system abolition (CS=0.0) replaced by operational proposals (CS up to 1.0) | Confirmed |
 | **Strong** | Temporal trajectory: shift was immediate electoral jump (+0.180), peaked 2024-Q4 (0.648), reverting | Confirmed on 33 quarters |
 | **Strong** | Causal mechanism: electorally driven (before cabinet, after PVV election); coalition/learning/contagion less consistent with timing | Confirmed |
-| **Strong** | 2D extremity divergence: dimensions systematically differ (Wilcoxon p=0.002); material fell, stylistic rose | Confirmed on n=2,869 |
+| **Strong** | 2D extremity: both dimensions declined post-2024 (stijl −0.131, materieel −0.336); holistic moderation confirmed | Confirmed on n=3,030 |
 | **Moderate** | Mechanism classification: exploratory evidence for consensus framing (24% vs 8%, χ²=6.0, p=0.014) | Exploratory — κ=0.41 inter-rater reliability, n=200 classified motions |
 | **Strong** | Left-wing response: minimal change (−1.1 pp vs centrist +20.6 pp), 18.3x asymmetry | Confirmed |
 | **Moderate** | Anti-institutional pivot: abolition (nexit, constitution) disappeared; contestation (judiciary critique) increased | Keyword-based detection, small absolute counts |
 | **Moderate** | Strategic moderation in non-migration domains: volume up, material impact down | Consistent across 2,471 motions |
 | **Moderate** | Temporal sustainability: 2026-Q1 reversion suggests electoral-cycle effect, not permanent shift | Single quarter of reversion; needs 2+ more quarters to confirm |
-| **Inconclusive** | Whether extreme content genuinely declined or was repackaged in milder language | 2D scoring separates style from substance, but temporal content shift partially unresolved due to opposing style/material trajectories |
+| **Inconclusive** | Whether extreme content genuinely declined or was repackaged in milder language | 2D scoring confirms both style and substance declined; masking rate (S≤2, M≥4) is 9.7% — lower than initial estimates |
 
 ### Limitations
 
@@ -284,6 +284,8 @@ Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist s
 - **Success ceiling:** The 96%+ pass rate makes pass rate an insensitive dependent variable for measuring centrist influence on legislative outcomes. The success correlation findings should be interpreted as describing a real but practically constrained relationship.
 - **NSC sensitivity:** Removing NSC from the strict centrist set (leaving D66/CDA/CU) yields a nearly identical surge (+0.248 vs +0.256, Cohen's d = 0.63 vs 0.66). Only 3.1% of the reported effect is attributable to NSC inclusion.
 - **Submitter parsing:** The opposition-only filter relies on parse_lead_submitter(), which fails on 20% of pre-2024 and 29% of post-2024 motions. Unparsed motions have systematically higher centrist support (0.40 pre, 0.65 post vs 0.21 pre, 0.45 post for parsed). The reported opposition-only effect (d=0.85) is likely inflated by ~0.10–0.20; the true effect is probably d≈0.65–0.75. The direction is robust but the magnitude should be interpreted conservatively.
+- **Migration domain provenance:** The `category` column in `right_wing_motions` is NULL for all 3,030 classified motions (wiped by a pipeline bug). Migration vs non-migration classification relies on title keyword matching (e.g., "asiel", "migratie", "vreemdeling"), which is less reliable than the original LLM-based classification. The migration gateway finding is directionally robust but exact domain boundaries should be treated as approximate.
+- **2026-Q2 sample size:** The 2026-Q2 "bounce" (CS=0.523) is based on only 44 motions with a bimodal distribution (20 at CS=1.0, 18 at CS=0.0). The CS=1.0 motions include many consensus items (defense, infrastructure) unrelated to migration. This quarter's mean is sensitive to composition and should not be over-interpreted as evidence of a sustained trend.
 
 ### Visualization