md files
This commit is contained in:
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Three tiers:
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- [x] Mechanism classification (consensus framing confirmed, κ=0.41 moderate)
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- [x] Party differentiation (JA21 drives moderation, PVV entered government)
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- [x] Voting margin analysis (ρ=0.812, far superior to pass rate)
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- [x] Predictive model (AUC-ROC=0.81, RF=0.84)
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- [x] Predictive model (LR CV AUC-ROC=0.816, RF CV AUC-ROC=0.845, RF test=0.805)
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- [x] Coalition coding fix (2024 split at July 1)
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- [x] All-motion 2D extremity (29,591 motions, stijl=1.36, mat=2.12)
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- [x] HTML report with gravity-controlled charts + example motions
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@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ reports/overton_window/
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| Material impact (right-wing) | 2.79 | 2.45 | −0.34 |
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| M≥4 share (% high-impact) | 23.7% | 11.3% | −12.4 pp |
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| SVD cultural gap | 0.282 | 0.428 | +0.146 |
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| Stylistic extremity | 1.718 | 1.815 | +0.097 |
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| Migration CS | 0.153 | 0.369 | +0.216 |
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| Stylistic extremity | 1.875 | 1.744 | −0.131 |
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| Migration CS (strict 4-party) | 0.134 | 0.342 | +0.208 |
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| All-motion stijl | — | 1.36 | — |
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| All-motion materieel | — | 2.12 | — |
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| Stijl-materieel r (RW) | — | 0.47 | — |
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@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Migration = category `asiel/vreemdelingen`. Non-migration = all other categories
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| Domain | Pre-2024 Mean CS | Post-2024 Mean CS | Δ CS |
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|--------|-----------------|------------------|------|
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| Migration | 0.125 | 0.343 | +0.218 |
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| Migration | 0.320 | 0.514 | +0.194 |
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| Non-migration | 0.436 | 0.509 | +0.073 |
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## 5. Material Impact-Stratified Centrist Support
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@@ -204,4 +204,4 @@ If both rose equally, a systemic factor (coalition change, polarization) is at w
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## 12. Conclusion
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*(Fill in after reviewing all indicators and audit results.)*
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Centrist support for right-wing motions rose from 25% to 51% after 2024, with the shift concentrated in the quarter following the PVV's November 2023 election victory. The change was uniform across material impact levels, and the timing points to an electoral rather than coalition-driven mechanism. Whether this shift persists beyond the current parliamentary term remains an open question.
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@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@ political events to distinguish between competing causal explanations.
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**Shift velocity (4Q pre vs 4Q post):** 0.338
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**Shift onset relative to Schoof cabinet:** BEFORE cabinet formation
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**Shift shape test:** **IMMEDIATE** — the structural break jump (2026-Q1 -> 2026-Q2) was +0.189, exceeding the 0.1 threshold.
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**Shift shape test:** **IMMEDIATE** — the main structural break jump at 2024-Q1 was +0.180 (0.321 to 0.501), exceeding the 0.1 threshold. A secondary bounce occurred at 2026-Q2 (+0.189, from 0.334 to 0.523).
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- Max single-quarter jump: 0.2289 at 2020-Q4
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- Average absolute quarterly change: 0.0999
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- Jump ratio (max / avg): 2.29x
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- Pre-inflection average QoQ delta: +0.0112
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- Post-inflection average QoQ delta: +0.0024
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The largest single-quarter jump was +0.229 (2020-Q3 -> 2020-Q4). However, the **structural break** occurs at the shift onset: +0.189 (2026-Q1 -> 2026-Q2), which is 1.9x the average quarterly change (0.100). Pre-inflection spikes (e.g. 2020-Q4: +0.229) reverted within one quarter, while the 2026-Q2 structural break was **sustained** — centrist support stayed above 0.4 for 8 consecutive quarters afterward.
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The largest single-quarter jump was +0.229 (2020-Q3 -> 2020-Q4). However, the **main structural break** occurs at the shift onset: +0.180 at 2024-Q1, which is 1.8x the average quarterly change (0.100). Pre-inflection spikes (e.g. 2020-Q4: +0.229) reverted within one quarter, while the 2024-Q1 break was **sustained**: centrist support stayed above 0.4 for 8 consecutive quarters (2024-Q1 through 2025-Q4). A secondary bounce at 2026-Q2 (+0.189, from 0.334 to 0.523) followed a brief dip below 0.4 in 2026-Q1.
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**Key insight:** The centrist support shift began **
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BEFORE the Schoof cabinet formation** (July 2024) and
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@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ The adjustment was immediate upon the electoral signal (PVV victory, Nov 2023).
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The centrist support surge for right-wing motions is primarily an **electoral shock phenomenon**.
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The inflection point (2024-Q1) occurs in the quarter immediately following
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the PVV's November 2023 election victory. Centrist support jumped by
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+0.19 (2026-Q1 -> 2026-Q2) — 2x
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the typical quarterly variation (0.100).
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+0.180 at the main break (2023-Q4 to 2024-Q1), 1.8x
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the typical quarterly variation (0.100). A secondary bounce of +0.189 occurred at 2026-Q2 after a brief dip below 0.4.
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This rules out prominent alternative explanations:
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- **Coalition dynamics** cannot explain it — the shift preceded cabinet formation.
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ when stylistic and material extremity scores are analyzed separately over time.
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| Dimension | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ |
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|-----------|--------------|---------------|-----|
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| Stylistic extremity | 1.725 | 1.797 | 0.072 |
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| Stylistic extremity | 1.875 | 1.744 | -0.131 |
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| Material impact | 2.535 | 2.440 | -0.095 |
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| Text score (original) | 2.063 | 2.190 | 0.127 |
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| Gap (M-S) | 0.810 | 0.643 | -0.167 |
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@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ and material extremity.
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**Post-2024 mean r(stijl,mat):** 0.439
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**Change test (Mann-Whitney):** U=10.000, p=0.571
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**Change test (Mann-Whitney):** U=7.0, p=0.517
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**Interpretation:** No significant change in stijl-material correlation (U=10.0, p=0.5714)
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**Interpretation:** No significant change in stijl-material correlation (U=7.0, p=0.517)
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A significant change in the per-year stijl-material correlation would suggest
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that the relationship between the two dimensions itself shifted across the break period —
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@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ M≥4 = motions with fundamental material impact (score ≥ 4).
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| Bucket | Pre-2024 Mean Stijl | Pre-2024 Mean Mat | Post-2024 Mean Stijl | Post-2024 Mean Mat |
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|--------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
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| All RW | 1.725 | 2.535 | 1.797 | 2.440 |
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| All RW | 1.875 | 2.535 | 1.744 | 2.440 |
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| M≥3 | 2.296 | 3.504 | 2.172 | 3.300 |
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| M≥4 | 2.626 | 4.183 | 2.659 | 4.154 |
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@@ -231,8 +231,8 @@ parliamentary trends.
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| Period | All Stijl | All Mat | RW Stijl | RW Mat | Stijl Δ | Mat Δ |
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|--------|-----------|---------|----------|--------|---------|-------|
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| Pre-2024 | 1.227 | 1.923 | 1.725 | 2.535 | 0.497 | 0.612 |
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| Post-2024 | 1.391 | 2.041 | 1.797 | 2.440 | 0.405 | 0.399 |
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| Pre-2024 | 1.360 | 2.120 | 1.875 | 2.535 | 0.515 | 0.415 |
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| Post-2024 | 1.390 | 2.040 | 1.744 | 2.440 | 0.354 | 0.400 |
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---
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@@ -243,6 +243,6 @@ consistent with the aggregate finding of r≈0.47.
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The divergence test (wilcoxon_signed_rank) found significant systematic divergence between stylistic and material yearly means (p=0.002).
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The pre/post correlation change analysis no significant change in stijl-material correlation (u=10.0, p=0.5714).
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The pre/post correlation change analysis found no significant change in stijl-material correlation (U=7.0, p=0.517).
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The gap (material minus stylistic) narrowed from 0.810 pre-2024 to 0.643 post-2024.
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+35764
-547
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ The data tells a different story.
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Using 29,591 Tweede Kamer motions with full MP-level vote records, Procrustes-aligned
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SVD spatial analysis, and 2D extremity scoring (stijl-extremiteit vs materiële
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impact), we find that **the Overton window widened**: centrist support for
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right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for non-right-wing
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right-wing motions rose from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for non-right-wing
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motions rose modestly (58%→62%, +3.5 pp). What changed was the behavior of right-wing parties:
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they filed more motions, with milder content, framed in centrist-friendly
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language. Centrist voting support surged from 0.251 to 0.507 (Cohen's d = +0.65),
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language. Centrist voting support rose from 0.251 to 0.507 (Cohen's d = +0.65),
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but centrists did not become more right-wing. They stayed ideologically left
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while voting more permissively on proposals that had become less materially
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consequential.
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@@ -305,14 +305,14 @@ fig2.update_layout(
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fig2.show()
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```
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The gravity-controlled chart reveals a critical pattern: the centrist support
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The gravity-controlled chart shows a consistent pattern: the centrist support
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shift is real at **every** material impact level. From M=1 (mild procedural
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adjustments, +0.292) to M=5 (systemic overhaul, +0.122), centrist support rose
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across the board. The largest absolute gains came from the middle range (M=2:
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+0.205, M=3: +0.219, M=4: +0.267), where most right-wing motions cluster.
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Comparing right-wing motions against all other motions confirms the shift is
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specific: right-wing centrist support surged by +0.236, while non-right-wing
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specific: right-wing centrist support rose by +0.236, while non-right-wing
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motions remained essentially flat (−0.006). This is a right-wing-specific
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phenomenon, not a general parliamentary trend.
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@@ -320,11 +320,11 @@ phenomenon, not a general parliamentary trend.
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Right-wing motions span ten policy categories, and the 2024 centrist support shift
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was not uniform across them. Every category gained centrist support, but the magnitudes
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vary dramatically — from a surge of +0.39 for climate and energy to a modest +0.08
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vary dramatically, from a jump of +0.39 for climate and energy to a modest +0.08
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for education and science.
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Leading the shift are **energie/klimaat** (+0.392), **buitenland/europa** (+0.364),
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and **economie** (+0.342) — domains where right-wing parties adopted centrist-friendly
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and **economie** (+0.342), domains where right-wing parties adopted centrist-friendly
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framing and right-wing governments in other European countries provided template
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policies. At the other end, **onderwijs/wetenschap** (+0.081) and **veiligheid/justitie**
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(+0.138) barely moved, consistent with their roles as high-consensus domains where
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@@ -370,13 +370,13 @@ fig7.update_layout(
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fig7.show()
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```
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The pattern reveals a political gradient. Domains tied to European integration
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(buitenland/europa) and climate action (energie/klimaat) — where center-right
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governments abroad provided cover — saw the largest shifts. Domestic social domains
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The pattern shows a political gradient. Domains tied to European integration
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(buitenland/europa) and climate action (energie/klimaat), where center-right
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governments abroad provided cover, saw the largest shifts. Domestic social domains
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(zorg/gezondheid, onderwijs/wetenschap) were largely insulated. The migration domain
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(asiel/vreemdelingen), central to the Overton narrative, ranked seventh with a
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+0.210 delta — substantial but not exceptional. Its importance lies not in the
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magnitude of the shift but in its durability: migration centrist support sustained
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+0.210 delta, substantial but not exceptional. What matters is its durability
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rather than its size: migration centrist support sustained
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its gains through 2025 while non-migration domains reverted.
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## Indicator 2: Spatial Divergence
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@@ -438,12 +438,12 @@ patterns. The centrist center of gravity moved toward welfare and cosmopolitanis
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while right-wing parties moved further into the nationalist corner.
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Why this makes sense with the voting data: The SVD captures the *full*
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voting landscape, including all motions, not just the ones centrists supported.
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voting record, including all motions, not just the ones centrists supported.
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Right-wing parties continued filing high-impact motions that centrists opposed,
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while simultaneously filing a much larger volume of milder motions centrists
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supported. The net effect on SVD was centrist-left divergence: the extreme
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motions (still opposed by centrists) dominated the voting structure, while the
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surge of milder centrist-supported motions added volume without shifting party
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increase in milder centrist-supported motions added volume without shifting party
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positions. This is "acceptance without conversion." Centrists vote more with
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right-wing motions while moving further from them ideologically.
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@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ The original single-dimensional extremity score showed no increase post-2024
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right-wing motions become more radical?
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The answer lies in what the single score measured. Two-dimensional rescoring
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of all 29,591 motions reveals that stylistic extremity and material impact are
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of all 29,591 motions shows that stylistic extremity and material impact are
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only moderately correlated (r = 0.43). When tracked separately over time, they
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tell different stories.
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@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ AND less substantively impactful.
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Compared to all motions, right-wing motions score higher on both dimensions:
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stijl +0.47, materieel +0.54. The masking rate, restrained language paired
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with high material impact, is 9.7% (S≤2, M≥4) or 13.5% (S=1, M≥3) for right-wing motions
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vs 24.0% for all motions. Right-wing proposals disproportionately use
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vs 3.5% for all motions. Right-wing proposals disproportionately use
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procedural language to advance consequential policy.
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## Mechanisms of Influence
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@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ Consensus framing is significantly more common in high-support motions (24%)
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than low-support (8%): χ²(1) = 6.00, p = 0.014. Exploratory evidence suggests
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consensus framing drives centrist support. Note: inter-rater reliability for mechanism classification is moderate (κ = 0.41). These patterns are exploratory and require taxonomy refinement.
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**Party-level analysis** reveals the shift is not uniform. JA21 is the primary
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At the party level, the shift is not uniform. JA21 is the primary
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driver, with a +0.203 CS shift and the only volume + support gains combination.
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PVV entered government and filed fewer, milder motions. FVD remains structurally
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shunned. Its motions consistently fail to gain centrist support regardless of
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@@ -623,8 +623,8 @@ content.
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## Temporal Dynamics
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Quarterly analysis across 33 quarters (2016-Q2 through 2026-Q1) replaces the
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binary pre/post-2024 comparison with a continuous trajectory that reveals the
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exact timing, shape, and sustainability of the shift.
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binary pre/post-2024 comparison with a continuous trajectory that shows the
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exact timing and trajectory of the shift.
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```{python}
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#| label: chart-6-quarterly
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@@ -726,18 +726,18 @@ coalition dynamics as the primary driver. The most parsimonious explanation: cen
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parties perceived the PVV's electoral success as a mandate for right-wing policy
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and adjusted their voting behavior accordingly. However, the temporal analysis cannot fully distinguish between strategic anticipation during coalition formation and a genuine shift in centrist tolerance.
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**Sustainability.** The 2026-Q1 reversion to 0.334 raises a critical question:
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**Sustainability.** The 2026-Q1 reversion to 0.334 raises a key question:
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is the centrist support surge a temporary electoral-cycle effect rather than a
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permanent Overton window shift? Material moderation persisted (materieel ~2.4)
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through the decline, but stylistic extremity reverted from 1.70 to 2.02. CS was
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already declining through 2025 (0.648→0.450) despite continued moderation,
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suggesting the 2024 spike was primarily an electoral shock for non-migration domains. However, 2026-Q2 shows CS bouncing back to 0.523 (n=44, interpret cautiously), driven by the intensifying migration debate. Migration centrist support (0.395) now exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time. The shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration, durable for migration.
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which points to the 2024 spike as primarily an electoral shock for non-migration domains. However, 2026-Q2 shows CS bouncing back to 0.523 (n=44, interpret cautiously), driven by the intensifying migration debate. Migration centrist support (0.395) now exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time. The shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration, durable for migration.
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| Hypothesis | Evidence | Verdict |
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|------------|----------|---------|
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| Electoral shock | Jump immediately followed PVV victory (Nov 2023) | **Supported** |
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| Coalition dynamics | Shift began 3 quarters before cabinet formed | **Less consistent with the data** |
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| Gradual learning | Jump was 1.9× average quarterly — discrete, not incremental | **Less consistent with the data** |
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| Gradual learning | Jump was 1.9× average quarterly, discrete rather than incremental | **Less consistent with the data** |
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| European contagion | No Dutch response during 2022–2023 European shift | **Less consistent with the data** |
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```{python}
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@@ -823,11 +823,11 @@ fig8.show()
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acceptable after 2024. But the mechanism was right-wing moderation, not centrist
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conversion, and the effect may be temporary.**
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Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist
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Centrist support for right-wing motions rose from 25% to 51%, while centrist
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support for non-right-wing motions rose modestly (58%→62%, +3.5 pp). The window of acceptable
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debate expanded rightward.
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1. **Volume surged, impact declined.** Right-wing motions doubled in volume
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1. **Volume doubled, impact declined.** Right-wing motions doubled in volume
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post-2024, but material impact fell from 2.79 to 2.45 (Cohen's d = −0.36).
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The M ≥ 4 share dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling to 2.7%
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by 2026.
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@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ debate expanded rightward.
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extreme tail polarized even as cooperation grew on the moderate mass.
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5. **The shift is electorally driven and domain-specific.** Centrist support
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surged immediately after the PVV election, peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4, and
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jumped immediately after the PVV election, peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4, and
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declined through 2025 to 0.450 despite continued material moderation. Then
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hit 0.334 in 2026-Q1. But 2026-Q2 bounced back to 0.523 (n=44, interpret cautiously), driven by the
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intensifying migration debate. Non-migration acceptance was a temporary
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@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ debate expanded rightward.
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The gateway domain: migration. Migration is where the Overton shift is most
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genuine. The frames right-wing parties learned there, they then applied
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elsewhere. Material impact barely declined (−0.13), yet centrist support more
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than doubled (0.153 → 0.369). Centrists went from zero support for M = 5
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than doubled (0.134 to 0.342). Centrists went from zero support for M = 5
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migration motions to nearly 20%. The gradient between impact levels flattened.
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Centrists became willing to support migration motions at every severity level.
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This is measurable acceptance expansion,
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@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ driven primarily by CDA and ChristenUnie rather than D66. What started as a
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migration-specific acceptance shift became the template for broader Overton
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widening across climate, security, and economic policy. As of 2026, migration
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centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time,
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confirming that migration acceptance is durable while non-migration acceptance
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which indicates that migration acceptance is durable while non-migration acceptance
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was the temporary component. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received
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unanimous centrist support (CS = 1.00), including high-impact items.
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@@ -10,18 +10,18 @@
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| Indicator | Pre-2024 | Post-2024 | Δ | Verdict |
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|-----------|----------|-----------|---|--------|
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| Centrist support (strict) | 0.251 | 0.507 | +0.256 | **Surged** |
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| Centrist support (strict) | 0.251 | 0.507 | +0.256 | **Rose** |
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| Material impact (2D) | 2.79 | 2.45 | −0.34 | **Declined** |
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| M≥4 share (% high-impact) | 23.7% | 11.3% | −12.4 pp | **Declined** |
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| SVD cultural gap (centrist−right) | 0.282 | 0.428 | +0.146 | **Diverged** |
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| Stylistic extremity (2D) | 1.875 | 1.744 | −0.131 | **Declined** |
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| Temporal trajectory | - | - | - | **Immediate electoral jump, reverting** |
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Centrist support surged. Centrist parties moved *left* spatially while voting *more* with right-wing motions. But the motions themselves became *less* materially impactful. The share of high-impact proposals (M≥4) dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026 (2.7%). The Overton window **widened**: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable. Right-wing parties shifted their strategy toward the window: they filed more motions, with milder content, framed in centrist-friendly language. The center rewarded the framing without moving ideologically.
|
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Centrist support rose. Centrist parties moved *left* spatially while voting *more* with right-wing motions. But the motions themselves became *less* materially impactful. The share of high-impact proposals (M≥4) dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026 (2.7%). The Overton window **widened**: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable. Right-wing parties shifted their strategy toward the window: they filed more motions, with milder content, framed in centrist-friendly language. The center rewarded the framing without moving ideologically.
|
||||
|
||||
Two additional findings deepen the picture. First, the 2D extremity decomposition shows both dimensions declined: stylistic extremity fell (−0.131) alongside material impact (−0.35). Right-wing motions became less rhetorically hostile AND less materially consequential, a holistic moderation strategy, not just surface-level repackaging. Second, the temporal trajectory reveals the shift was an **immediate electoral jump** (+0.180 in a single quarter) that peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4 and has since reverted to 0.334 by 2026-Q1. The shift may be an electoral-cycle phenomenon rather than a permanent Overton window movement.
|
||||
Two additional findings deepen the picture. First, the 2D extremity decomposition shows both dimensions declined: stylistic extremity fell (−0.131) alongside material impact (−0.35). Right-wing motions became less rhetorically hostile AND less materially consequential, a across-the-board moderation strategy, not just surface-level repackaging. Second, the temporal trajectory reveals the shift was an **immediate electoral jump** (+0.180 in a single quarter) that peaked at 0.648 in 2024-Q4 and has since reverted to 0.334 by 2026-Q1. The shift may be an electoral-cycle phenomenon rather than a permanent Overton window movement.
|
||||
|
||||
This is **acceptance through moderation**, not acceptance through conversion. Right-wing influence grew by becoming more centrist-compatible, not by making centrists more right-wing.
|
||||
This is acceptance through moderation. Right-wing influence grew because right-wing parties became more centrist-compatible, not because centrists became more right-wing.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ The aggregate shift masks two distinct stories. Breaking the data by policy doma
|
||||
|--------|--------|---------|----------|-----------|---------|
|
||||
| Non-migration (all) | 0.268 | 0.534 | 20.8% | 8.0% | Moderation dominates |
|
||||
| Climate/stikstof/energy | 0.303 | 0.554 | 26.3% | 6.3% | Strong moderation |
|
||||
| **Migration (asiel)** | **0.153** | **0.369** | **44.1%** | **28.9%** | **Mixed: acceptance + moderation** |
|
||||
| **Migration (asiel)** | **0.134** | **0.342** | **44.1%** | **28.9%** | **Mixed: acceptance + moderation** |
|
||||
|
||||
**Non-migration (85% of motions):** The story is clear strategic moderation. Right-wing parties doubled motion volume while halving the share of high-impact proposals (M≥4: 20.8%→8.0%). They shifted from system-level abolition to operational adjustments, specifically targeted rule changes rather than framework destruction. Example: pre-2024 motions demanded "abolish all nitrogen policy" or "exit the Paris climate accord" (M=5, CS=0.0 every time). Post-2024 motions propose "build four nuclear plants" or "create a methane-reduction feed agreement with farmers" (M=2-4, CS=1.0). Centrists rewarded the operational framing.
|
||||
|
||||
**Migration (15% of motions):** The pattern is different. Material impact barely changed (3.26→3.13, only −0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled (0.153→0.369). Centrists went from *never* supporting M=5 migration motions (CS=0.000) to backing nearly 1 in 5 (CS=0.185). The gradient between impact levels flattened significantly. Centrists still differentiate, but the gap narrowed. This is the one domain where genuine acceptance expansion (not just content moderation) is measurable.
|
||||
**Migration (15% of motions):** The pattern is different. Material impact barely changed (3.26 to 3.13, only -0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled (0.134 to 0.342). Centrists went from *never* supporting M=5 migration motions (CS=0.000) to backing nearly 1 in 5 (CS=0.185). The gradient between impact levels flattened significantly. Centrists still differentiate, but the gap narrowed. This is the one domain where genuine acceptance expansion (not just content moderation) is measurable.
|
||||
|
||||
### Temporal Dynamics
|
||||
|
||||
Quarterly analysis across 33 quarters (2016-Q2 through 2026-Q1) replaces the binary pre/post-2024 comparison with a continuous trajectory that reveals the exact timing, shape, and sustainability of the shift.
|
||||
Quarterly analysis across 33 quarters (2016-Q2 through 2026-Q1) replaces the binary pre/post-2024 comparison with a continuous trajectory that shows the exact timing and trajectory of the shift.
|
||||
|
||||
**Timing.** The inflection point is 2024-Q1, the quarter immediately following the PVV's November 2023 election victory. Centrist support jumped from 0.321 (2023-Q4) to 0.501 (2024-Q1), a single-quarter increase of +0.180, roughly twice the average quarterly change of 0.097. This was a discrete structural break, not a gradual ramp. The pre-inflection mean (0.329 across 24 quarters) was stable and low. The post-inflection mean (0.514 across 9 quarters) is substantially higher, but the trajectory within the post-inflection period tells a more nuanced story.
|
||||
**Timing.** The inflection point is 2024-Q1, the quarter immediately following the PVV's November 2023 election victory. Centrist support jumped from 0.321 (2023-Q4) to 0.501 (2024-Q1), a single-quarter increase of +0.180, roughly twice the average quarterly change of 0.097. This was a discrete structural break, not a gradual ramp. The pre-inflection mean (0.329 across 24 quarters) was stable and low. The post-inflection mean (0.514 across 9 quarters) is substantially higher, but the trajectory within the post-inflection period is more complicated.
|
||||
|
||||
**Shape.** Centrist support rose sharply from 2024-Q1 through 2024-Q4, reaching an all-time peak of 0.648 in the first full quarter of the Schoof cabinet. From that peak, it declined steadily: 0.598 in 2025-Q1, 0.503 in 2025-Q2, 0.437 in 2025-Q3, 0.450 in 2025-Q4, and 0.334 in 2026-Q1, below the 0.4 inflection threshold. The peak-to-current decline of 0.314 is larger in magnitude than the original pre-to-peak surge of 0.327.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Quarterly analysis across 33 quarters (2016-Q2 through 2026-Q1) replaces the bin
|
||||
|
||||
The most parsimonious explanation is that centrist parties perceived the PVV's electoral success as a mandate for right-wing policy and adjusted their voting behavior accordingly, even before the new cabinet was formed. Strategic moderation may have reinforced the shift once underway, but the trigger was electoral, not strategic. The temporal analysis rules out mechanical coalition effects but cannot distinguish between strategic anticipation during formation negotiations and a genuine shift in centrist tolerance. The causal mechanism remains underdetermined.
|
||||
|
||||
**Sustainability.** The trajectory is domain-specific. The 2026-Q1 reversion (CS = 0.334) suggested the shift was temporary. Material moderation persisted (materieel ~2.4) but stylistic moderation reverted (stijl 1.70→2.02), and centrist support was declining through 2025 (0.648→0.450). However, 2026-Q2 shows a significant bounce back to CS = 0.523 (N=44), driven by the intensifying migration debate. For the first time, migration-domain centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) in 2026, a structural reversal from the historical pattern where migration was always the lowest-acceptance domain. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received unanimous centrist support (CS=1.00), including high-impact (M=4) items. This suggests the Overton shift is not uniformly temporary: non-migration acceptance was an electoral shock response that faded, but migration acceptance appears durable and growing. The "acceptance through moderation" thesis describes the 2024 mechanism for non-migration domains, but migration has become self-sustaining as a political priority that transcends partisan framing.
|
||||
**Sustainability.** The trajectory is domain-specific. The 2026-Q1 reversion (CS = 0.334) suggested the shift was temporary. Material moderation persisted (materieel ~2.4) but stylistic moderation reverted (stijl 1.70→2.02), and centrist support was declining through 2025 (0.648→0.450). However, 2026-Q2 shows a significant bounce back to CS = 0.523 (N=44), driven by the intensifying migration debate. For the first time, migration-domain centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) in 2026, a structural reversal from the historical pattern where migration was always the lowest-acceptance domain. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received unanimous centrist support (CS=1.00), including high-impact (M=4) items. This suggests the Overton shift is not uniformly temporary: non-migration acceptance was an electoral shock response that faded, but migration acceptance appears durable and growing. The "acceptance through moderation" thesis describes the 2024 mechanism for non-migration domains, but migration has become self-sustaining as a political priority that crosses partisan lines.
|
||||
|
||||
### Who Drove the Shift? MP-Level Granularity
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ This is spatial *divergence*, not convergence. Centrist parties did not become r
|
||||
|
||||
**Why this makes sense with the material impact data:** The SVD captures the *full* voting record, including all motions, not just the ones centrists supported. Right-wing parties continued filing high-impact motions that centrists opposed, while simultaneously filing a much larger volume of milder motions centrists supported. The net effect on SVD was centrist-left divergence: the extreme motions (still opposed by centrists) dominated the voting structure, while the surge of milder centrist-supported motions added volume without shifting party positions.
|
||||
|
||||
The tension between greater voting support and greater ideological distance is the puzzle that the mechanism analysis resolves.
|
||||
The next section explains how greater voting support coexists with greater ideological distance.
|
||||
|
||||
**An important caveat:** SVD spatial positions capture *voting patterns*, not motion content or stated ideology. The finding that centrists moved left on the SVD axes means centrist parties' voting patterns became more distinct from right-wing voting patterns. It does not tell us whether the motions themselves became more right-wing or left-wing in content. A right-wing motion can score as "far right" on SVD because right-wing parties voted uniformly for it and left-wing parties uniformly against it, while the motion's textual content may be moderate. Conversely, a motion on a topic centrists and right-wing parties agree on (e.g., defense spending, nuclear energy) would show little spatial separation regardless of how radical the motion text is. SVD measures agreement structure, not policy positions. The "acceptance without conversion" framework is therefore a claim about *voting behavior*, not about party manifestos or deputies' stated beliefs.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ A Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing yearly mean stylistic vs yearly mean mater
|
||||
|
||||
Domain-stratified analysis reveals the same pattern in both migration and non-migration motions. In migration, stylistic scores dropped from 2.70 to 2.51 while material declined from 3.27 to 3.04. Both fell, with style falling faster. In non-migration, stylistic scores remained essentially flat (1.65→1.69) while material fell substantially (2.48→2.25). The per-year correlation between stylistic and material scores did not significantly change (Mann-Whitney U=9.0, p=0.79), suggesting the two dimensions have been consistently only moderately correlated throughout the entire period. This is not a new phenomenon triggered by the 2024 shift.
|
||||
|
||||
The practical implication: right-wing motions post-2024 are both less rhetorically hostile AND less substantively impactful. The strategic shift is holistic: it affects both the packaging and the content of what right-wing parties propose, not just how they say it.
|
||||
The practical implication: right-wing motions post-2024 are both less rhetorically hostile AND less substantively impactful. The strategic shift affects both the packaging and the content of what right-wing parties propose, not just how they say it.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Consensus framing (appealing to shared values: safety, efficiency, pragmatism, g
|
||||
|
||||
The mechanism × period interaction is significant (χ²(9) = 28.55, p < 0.001), indicating the distribution of mechanism types changed between periods. The largest shifts:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Institutioneel/rechtsstatelijk:** surging from 4.0% to 17.3% (+13.3 pp), mostly in *low*-support motions, indicating right-wing institutional critique increased but did not gain centrist acceptance.
|
||||
- **Institutioneel/rechtsstatelijk:** rising from 4.0% to 17.3% (+13.3 pp), mostly in *low*-support motions, indicating right-wing institutional critique increased but did not gain centrist acceptance.
|
||||
- **Crisisrespons:** collapsing from 14.0% to 0.7% (−13.3 pp). Right-wing parties abandoned crisis-framed motions.
|
||||
- **Gerichte restrictie:** rising from 14.0% to 22.7% (+8.7 pp). Targeted rights restrictions grew in both high- and low-support categories, but remain the dominant mechanism in low-support motions.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -241,11 +241,11 @@ The ceiling effect is the dominant methodological reality: when 96%+ of motions
|
||||
|
||||
**The Overton window widened: more right-wing positions became politically acceptable after 2024. The widening was primarily driven by an electoral shock, with content moderation as a contributing factor. The shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration domains, but durable and growing for migration.**
|
||||
|
||||
Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for non-right-wing motions rose only modestly (58%→62%, +3.5 pp). The window of acceptable debate expanded disproportionately for right-wing content. What changed was not what centrists found acceptable. It was what right-wing parties chose to propose:
|
||||
Centrist support for right-wing motions rose from 25% to 51%, while centrist support for non-right-wing motions rose only modestly (58% to 62%, +3.5 pp). The window of acceptable debate expanded disproportionately for right-wing content. What changed was not what centrists found acceptable. It was what right-wing parties chose to propose:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Motion volume surged, impact declined. Right-wing motions doubled in volume post-2024, but became measurably milder. Material impact fell from 2.79 to 2.45 (motion-level means). The share of M≥4 proposals dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026. The 2D extremity decomposition confirms both dimensions declined. Stylistic extremity fell (1.875→1.744) alongside material impact, consistent with holistic moderation of content, not just repackaging of radical substance.
|
||||
1. Motion volume doubled, impact declined. Right-wing motions doubled in volume post-2024, but became measurably milder. Material impact fell from 2.79 to 2.45 (motion-level means). The share of M≥4 proposals dropped from 23.7% to 11.3% and continued falling through 2026. The 2D extremity decomposition confirms both dimensions declined. Stylistic extremity fell (1.875→1.744) alongside material impact, consistent with moderation of both content and framing, not just repackaging of radical substance.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Centrists did not become more tolerant. The extremity-stratified centrist support gradient persists. Centrists still differentiate between mild and extreme motions post-2024. The across-the-board +0.25 baseline shift reflects that *the content within each bucket became milder on average*, not that centrists lowered their standards. The left-wing response confirms the asymmetry: centrist support surged by +20.6 pp while left-wing opposition barely changed (−1.1 pp), ruling out "left-wing hardening" as an alternative explanation.
|
||||
2. Centrists did not become more tolerant. The extremity-stratified centrist support gradient persists. Centrists still differentiate between mild and extreme motions post-2024. The across-the-board +0.25 baseline shift reflects that *the content within each bucket became milder on average*, not that centrists lowered their standards.
|
||||
|
||||
3. The mechanism is strategic moderation. Exploratory evidence suggests this is the dominant pathway. The 200-motion mechanism classification found zero system-dismantling proposals among high-centrist-support post-2024 motions. The dominant pathways (procedural/technical at 32%, consensus framing at 24%, and targeted restriction at 17%) show right-wing parties learned which frames work. Consensus framing is significantly more common in high-support than low-support motions (χ²=6.0, p=0.014). This confirms and extends the original 24-motion qualitative finding with a structured, stratified sample.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -253,13 +253,13 @@ Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist s
|
||||
|
||||
5. The shift is electorally driven and domain-specific. Quarterly trajectory data shows the centrist support surge was an immediate electoral response to the PVV's November 2023 victory, jumping +0.180 in a single quarter, before the Schoof cabinet formed. Coalition dynamics, gradual learning, and European contagion are less consistent with the timing. Centrist support peaked at 0.648 (2024-Q4), declined through 2025, and hit 0.334 in 2026-Q1, suggesting an electoral-cycle effect. However, 2026-Q2 shows a bounce to 0.523 (n=44, bimodal distribution; interpret cautiously), driven partly by the intensifying migration debate. The reversion was real for non-migration domains (where the shock response faded), but migration acceptance has become self-sustaining and is now the dominant driver of continued Overton widening.
|
||||
|
||||
**The gateway domain: migration.** The asylum/migration domain is where the Overton shift is most genuine, and where right-wing parties learned the frames they then applied elsewhere. Material impact barely declined (−0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled (0.153→0.369). Centrists went from zero support for M=5 migration motions to nearly 20%. The gradient between impact levels flattened. Centrists became willing to support migration motions at every severity level. This is not just strategic moderation: it is measurable acceptance expansion, driven primarily by CDA and ChristenUnie rather than D66. Migration is also the domain where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy. What started as a migration-specific acceptance shift became the template for the broader Overton widening. As of 2026, migration centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time, a structural reversal confirming that migration acceptance is durable and growing while non-migration acceptance was the temporary electoral shock response. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received unanimous centrist support (CS=1.00), including high-impact items, as the Dutch migration debate intensified.
|
||||
**The gateway domain: migration.** The asylum/migration domain is where the Overton shift is most genuine, and where right-wing parties learned the frames they then applied elsewhere. Material impact barely declined (−0.13), yet centrist support more than doubled (0.134 to 0.342). Centrists went from zero support for M=5 migration motions to nearly 20%. The gradient between impact levels flattened. Centrists became willing to support migration motions at every severity level. This is not just strategic moderation: it is measurable acceptance expansion, driven primarily by CDA and ChristenUnie rather than D66. Migration is also the domain where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy. What started as a migration-specific acceptance shift became the template for the broader Overton widening. As of 2026, migration centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) for the first time, a structural reversal confirming that migration acceptance is durable and growing while non-migration acceptance was the temporary electoral shock response. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received unanimous centrist support (CS=1.00), including high-impact items, as the Dutch migration debate intensified.
|
||||
|
||||
### Uncertainty Hierarchy
|
||||
|
||||
| Level | Finding | Status |
|
||||
|-------|---------|--------|
|
||||
| **Strong** | Centrist voting support surged (d = +0.65 strict, d = +0.85 opposition-only) | Confirmed |
|
||||
| **Strong** | Centrist voting support rose (d = +0.65 strict, d = +0.85 opposition-only) | Confirmed |
|
||||
| **Strong** | Material impact of right-wing motions *declined* post-2024 (2.79→2.45 motion-level, M≥4 share: 23.7%→11.3%) | Confirmed on n=3,030 |
|
||||
| **Strong** | SVD spatial divergence, centrists moved left, right moved further right | Confirmed |
|
||||
| **Strong** | Migration domain: centrist M=5 support went from 0.0 to 0.185, acceptance expansion | Confirmed on n=379 migration motions |
|
||||
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ Centrist support for right-wing motions surged from 25% to 51%, while centrist s
|
||||
| **Strong** | Climate/stikstof: system abolition (CS=0.0) replaced by operational proposals (CS up to 1.0) | Confirmed |
|
||||
| **Strong** | Temporal trajectory: shift was immediate electoral jump (+0.180), peaked 2024-Q4 (0.648), reverting | Confirmed on 33 quarters |
|
||||
| **Strong** | Causal mechanism: electorally driven (before cabinet, after PVV election); coalition/learning/contagion less consistent with timing | Confirmed |
|
||||
| **Strong** | 2D extremity: both dimensions declined post-2024 (stijl −0.131, materieel −0.336); holistic moderation confirmed | Confirmed on n=3,030 |
|
||||
| **Strong** | 2D extremity: both dimensions declined post-2024 (stijl −0.131, materieel −0.336); across-the-board moderation confirmed | Confirmed on n=3,030 |
|
||||
| **Moderate** | Mechanism classification: exploratory evidence for consensus framing (24% vs 8%, χ²=6.0, p=0.014) | Exploratory, κ=0.41 inter-rater reliability, n=200 classified motions |
|
||||
| **Strong** | Left-wing response: minimal change (−1.1 pp vs centrist +20.6 pp), 18.3x asymmetry | Confirmed |
|
||||
| **Moderate** | Anti-institutional pivot: abolition (nexit, constitution) disappeared; contestation (judiciary critique) increased | Keyword-based detection, small absolute counts |
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user