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style: humanize reports and translate Streamlit UI to English

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Streamlit tabs: translated all Dutch text to English in overton.py,
compass.py (Overton expander + voting discipline), trajectories.py.

Humanization (all 3 report surfaces):
- Removed 60+ em dashes, replaced with periods/commas/colons
- Removed AI vocabulary (crucial, pivotal, underscores, landscape)
- Removed excessive boldface, rule-of-three, -ing padding
- Replaced 'serves as'/'stands as' with 'is'
- Preserved all data, numbers, tables, code blocks exactly
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2026-06-14 23:39:34 +02:00
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reports/overton_window/overton_report.html
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<!-- 2. What Is the Overton Window -->
<h2>What Is the Overton Window</h2>
<p>The Overton window describes the range of policy ideas that are politically acceptable at a given time. In the Dutch parliamentary context, we operationalise this by measuring centrist support for motions at varying levels of policy extremity. The core question is not whether extreme motions pass, but whether centrist parties are willing to support them at all &mdash; a signal that a policy position has entered the realm of acceptable debate.</p>
<p>We model acceptability using a gravity framework: each motion is assigned a gravity level (M1 through M5) based on its combined stylistic and material extremity. Higher gravity levels correspond to more extreme motions. The formation of the Schoof cabinet in July 2024 serves as the watershed. By comparing centrist support before and after this date, we can measure whether the Overton window shifted &mdash; and if so, by how much.</p>
<p>The Overton window describes the range of policy ideas that are politically acceptable at a given time. In the Dutch parliamentary context, we operationalise this by measuring centrist support for motions at varying levels of policy extremity. The core question is not whether extreme motions pass, but whether centrist parties are willing to support them at all. This is a signal that a policy position has entered the realm of acceptable debate.</p>
<p>We model acceptability using a gravity framework: each motion is assigned a gravity level (M1 through M5) based on its combined stylistic and material extremity. Higher gravity levels correspond to more extreme motions. The formation of the Schoof cabinet in July 2024 is the watershed. By comparing centrist support before and after this date, we can measure whether the Overton window shifted, and if so, by how much.</p>
<!-- 3. Methodology -->
<h2>Methodology</h2>
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
<div class="bar-group">
<div class="bar-label">
<span>M1 &mdash; Lowest extremity</span>
<span>M1: Lowest extremity</span>
<span class="n-count">Pre: 4,495 &middot; Post: 2,068</span>
</div>
<div class="bar-track"><div class="bar-fill pre" style="width: 71.5%"></div></div>
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
<div class="bar-group">
<div class="bar-label">
<span>M5 &mdash; Highest extremity</span>
<span>M5: Highest extremity</span>
<span class="n-count">Pre: 161 &middot; Post: 33</span>
</div>
<div class="bar-track"><div class="bar-fill pre" style="width: 13.8%"></div></div>
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@
<div class="bar-group">
<div class="bar-label">
<span>M1 &mdash; Lowest extremity</span>
<span>M1: Lowest extremity</span>
<span class="n-count">Pre: 4,495 &middot; Post: 2,068</span>
</div>
<div class="bar-track"><div class="bar-fill pre" style="width: 71.8%"></div></div>
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@
<div class="bar-group">
<div class="bar-label">
<span>M5 &mdash; Highest extremity</span>
<span>M5: Highest extremity</span>
<span class="n-count">Pre: 161 &middot; Post: 33</span>
</div>
<div class="bar-track"><div class="bar-fill pre" style="width: 4.4%"></div></div>
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@
</div>
<div class="note">
<strong>Interpretation.</strong> Under the strict 4-party model, cs_strict values are indeed lower than the all-party figures. At M5, the centrist core went from cs_strict = 0.044 pre-2024 to 0.101 post-2024 &mdash; a 2.3x relative increase but still very low in absolute terms. This suggests that while the strict centrist core became more tolerant of extreme motions after the 2024 watershed, the absolute level of acceptance remains modest. The shift is real but not transformative for the most extreme proposals.
<strong>Interpretation.</strong> Under the strict 4-party model, cs_strict values are indeed lower than the all-party figures. At M5, the centrist core went from cs_strict = 0.044 pre-2024 to 0.101 post-2024, a 2.3x relative increase but still very low in absolute terms. This suggests that while the strict centrist core became more tolerant of extreme motions after the 2024 watershed, the absolute level of acceptance remains modest. The shift is real but not transformative for the most extreme proposals.
</div>
<!-- 6. Example Motions -->
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@
<div class="motion-box">
<div class="motion-id">Motion 144 &middot; Hidden Impact</div>
<div class="motion-title">Motie van het lid Eerdmans over zich inzetten voor juridische en politieke ruimte om asielprocedures buiten de EU te kunnen afhandelen</div>
<p>This motion proposes external processing of asylum procedures outside the EU. It scores <strong>stijl = 1</strong> (neutral legal language, no rhetorical escalation) but <strong>materieel = 4</strong> (fundamental policy reform). The modest stylistic framing masks the substantive ambition. The strict centrist support (cs_strict) rose from <strong>0.00</strong> pre-2024 to <strong>1.00</strong> post-2024 &mdash; a motion that no centrist party would touch before the Schoof cabinet became universally acceptable after.</p>
<p>This motion proposes external processing of asylum procedures outside the EU. It scores <strong>stijl = 1</strong> (neutral legal language, no rhetorical escalation) but <strong>materieel = 4</strong> (fundamental policy reform). The modest stylistic framing masks the substantive ambition. The strict centrist support (cs_strict) rose from <strong>0.00</strong> pre-2024 to <strong>1.00</strong> post-2024, a motion that no centrist party would touch before the Schoof cabinet became universally acceptable after.</p>
<div class="motion-stats">
<div class="motion-stat"><div class="stat-label">Stijl</div><div class="stat-value">1</div></div>
<div class="motion-stat"><div class="stat-label">Materieel</div><div class="stat-value">4</div></div>
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
<div class="motion-box">
<div class="motion-id">Motion 28109 &middot; The Line</div>
<div class="motion-title">Motie van de leden Van Haga en Smolders over het Vluchtelingenverdrag uit 1951 opzeggen</div>
<p>This motion calls for withdrawing from the 1951 Refugee Convention. It scores <strong>stijl = 5</strong> and <strong>materieel = 5</strong> &mdash; maximum extremity on both dimensions. Despite the broader post-2024 shift in the Overton window, strict centrist support remained at <strong>0.00</strong> both before and after the watershed. Some positions remain outside the window of acceptability regardless of the political climate.</p>
<p>This motion calls for withdrawing from the 1951 Refugee Convention. It scores <strong>stijl = 5</strong> and <strong>materieel = 5</strong>, maximum extremity on both dimensions. Despite the broader post-2024 shift in the Overton window, strict centrist support remained at <strong>0.00</strong> both before and after the watershed. Some positions remain outside the window of acceptability regardless of the political climate.</p>
<div class="motion-stats">
<div class="motion-stat"><div class="stat-label">Stijl</div><div class="stat-value">5</div></div>
<div class="motion-stat"><div class="stat-label">Materieel</div><div class="stat-value">5</div></div>
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
<div class="motion-box">
<div class="motion-id">Motion 306 &middot; The Shift</div>
<div class="motion-title">Motie van de leden Boomsma en Van Zanten over maatregelen voor de vrijwillige terugkeer van Syri&euml;rs</div>
<p>This motion proposes measures for voluntary return of Syrians. It scores <strong>stijl = 2</strong> and <strong>materieel = 3</strong> &mdash; moderate on both dimensions. Strict centrist support went from <strong>0.00</strong> pre-2024 to <strong>1.00</strong> post-2024. This motion exemplifies the category of proposals that crossed the acceptability threshold after the political watershed, gaining full support from the centrist core where it previously had none.</p>
<p>This motion proposes measures for voluntary return of Syrians. It scores <strong>stijl = 2</strong> and <strong>materieel = 3</strong>, moderate on both dimensions. Strict centrist support went from <strong>0.00</strong> pre-2024 to <strong>1.00</strong> post-2024. This motion exemplifies the category of proposals that crossed the acceptability threshold after the political watershed, gaining full support from the centrist core where it previously had none.</p>
<div class="motion-stats">
<div class="motion-stat"><div class="stat-label">Stijl</div><div class="stat-value">2</div></div>
<div class="motion-stat"><div class="stat-label">Materieel</div><div class="stat-value">3</div></div>
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@
</div>
<!-- 7. Yearly Trend -- M3+ Motions -->
<h2>Yearly Trend &mdash; M3+ Strict Centrist Support</h2>
<h2>Yearly Trend: M3+ Strict Centrist Support</h2>
<p>Annual strict centrist support for motions at gravity level M3 and above. Years 2016&ndash;2018 have very low motion counts and should be interpreted with caution.</p>
<div class="chart-block">
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@
</div>
</div>
<p>Right-wing motions saw a substantial increase in centrist support after the 2024 watershed, rising from 0.384 to 0.620 &mdash; a gain of 0.236 points. In contrast, centrist support for motions from other parties remained essentially flat (0.587 pre vs 0.581 post). This asymmetric shift is the central finding of the analysis: the Overton window moved primarily on the right flank, with centrist parties becoming more willing to support proposals originating from the right wing, while their behaviour toward other party motions did not change.</p>
<p>Right-wing motions saw a substantial increase in centrist support after the 2024 watershed, rising from 0.384 to 0.620, a gain of 0.236 points. In contrast, centrist support for motions from other parties remained essentially flat (0.587 pre vs 0.581 post). This asymmetric shift is the central finding of the analysis: the Overton window moved primarily on the right flank, with centrist parties becoming more willing to support proposals originating from the right wing, while their behaviour toward other party motions did not change.</p>
<!-- 9. 2D Distribution -->
<h2>2D Distribution: Stijl vs Materieel</h2>
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 &mdash; Lowest</td>
<td>1: Lowest</td>
<td class="hm-mid"><div class="cell-val">6,010</div><div class="cell-pct">20.31%</div></td>
<td class="highlight"><div class="cell-val">11,428</div><div class="cell-pct">38.62%</div></td>
<td class="hm-mid"><div class="cell-val">3,194</div><div class="cell-pct">10.79%</div></td>
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
<td><div class="cell-val">49</div><div class="cell-pct">0.17%</div></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 &mdash; Highest</td>
<td>5: Highest</td>
<td><div class="cell-val">2</div><div class="cell-pct">0.01%</div></td>
<td><div class="cell-val">2</div><div class="cell-pct">0.01%</div></td>
<td><div class="cell-val">7</div><div class="cell-pct">0.02%</div></td>
@@ -534,15 +534,15 @@
</div>
<!-- 10. Key Takeaways -->
<h2>Key Takeaways</h2>
<h2>Takeaways</h2>
<div class="verdict">
<ul>
<li><strong>Exploratory evidence suggests an Overton shift for right-wing motions.</strong> Centrist support for motions proposed by right-wing parties rose from 0.384 to 0.620 after July 2024, while support for other party motions stayed flat. However, inter-annotator agreement on mechanism classification was moderate (κ = 0.41), meaning the mechanism evidence should be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive.</li>
<li><strong>Migration is the gateway domain.</strong> Asylum/migration is where the Overton shift is most genuine &mdash; centrist support more than doubled (0.153 &rarr; 0.369) while material impact barely declined. Centrists went from zero support for the most extreme migration motions to nearly 20%. This domain is where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy.</li>
<li><strong>Centrist tolerance increased at all gravity levels.</strong> Under both the all-party and strict 4-party centrist models, post-2024 centrist support was higher at gravity levels M3 through M5. The strict centrist core moved as well, not just the broader coalition.</li>
<li><strong>Shift is not across the board &mdash; M5 motions remain largely rejected.</strong> Even after the window shift, motions at the highest gravity level (M5) received only 10.1% strict centrist support. Some positions remain firmly outside the Overton window regardless of the political climate.</li>
<li><strong>Style and substance are only moderately correlated.</strong> With r = 0.43, the rhetorical framing of a motion and its substantive policy impact move partly independently. This means motions can be substantively radical but rhetorically cautious (like motion 144), potentially slipping through the window under the radar.</li>
<li><strong>The shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration, durable for migration.</strong> Non-migration centrist support peaked in 2024 and declined through 2025-2026, suggesting an electoral shock response. However, 2026-Q2 shows CS bouncing back to 0.523, driven by the intensifying migration debate. For the first time, migration centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) in 2026. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received unanimous centrist support (CS = 1.00), including high-impact items. The Overton widening on migration appears self-sustaining.</li>
<li>Exploratory evidence suggests an Overton shift for right-wing motions. Centrist support for motions proposed by right-wing parties rose from 0.384 to 0.620 after July 2024, while support for other party motions stayed flat. However, inter-annotator agreement on mechanism classification was moderate (κ = 0.41), meaning the mechanism evidence should be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive.</li>
<li>Migration is the gateway domain. Asylum/migration is where the Overton shift is most genuine: centrist support more than doubled (0.153 &rarr; 0.369) while material impact barely declined. Centrists went from zero support for the most extreme migration motions to nearly 20%. This domain is where right-wing parties first perfected the consensus framing and institutional appeals that later spread to climate, security, and economic policy.</li>
<li>Centrist tolerance increased at all gravity levels. Under both the all-party and strict 4-party centrist models, post-2024 centrist support was higher at gravity levels M3 through M5. The strict centrist core moved as well, not just the broader coalition.</li>
<li>Shift is not across the board: M5 motions remain largely rejected. Even after the window shift, motions at the highest gravity level (M5) received only 10.1% strict centrist support. Some positions remain firmly outside the Overton window regardless of the political climate.</li>
<li>Style and substance are only moderately correlated. With r = 0.43, the rhetorical framing of a motion and its substantive policy impact move partly independently. This means motions can be substantively radical but rhetorically cautious (like motion 144), potentially slipping through the window under the radar.</li>
<li>The shift is domain-specific: temporary for non-migration, durable for migration. Non-migration centrist support peaked in 2024 and declined through 2025-2026, suggesting an electoral shock response. However, 2026-Q2 shows CS bouncing back to 0.523, driven by the intensifying migration debate. For the first time, migration centrist support (0.395) exceeds non-migration (0.368) in 2026. Multiple 2026-Q2 migration motions received unanimous centrist support (CS = 1.00), including high-impact items. The Overton widening on migration appears self-sustaining.</li>
</ul>
</div>