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fix(overton): strict centrist definition + left support analysis

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- Reclassified centrist to {D66, CDA, CU, NSC} — removing VVD/BBB
  which are center-right coalition partners
- Added centrist_support_strict (0.251→0.507, d=+0.65), center_right_support,
  and left_support_mp columns via migration script
- Figure 1 now shows center-right (VVD/BBB) support as orange dashed line
- New Figure 3: bar chart of left-party support for right-wing motions
  (0.268→0.202, left opposition hardened)
- New report Section 6 covering left-wing support trends
- All analysis now uses strict centrist definition throughout
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2026-05-09 00:45:38 +02:00
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reports/overton_window/breakpoint_analysis.md
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@@ -12,19 +12,19 @@ and content extremity for right-wing motions in the Tweede Kamer.
## 1. Yearly Aggregate Metrics (All Right-Wing Motions)
| Year | N (RW) | Centrist Support | Extremity | Right Support | Left Opp. |
|------|--------|-----------------|-----------|---------------|----------|
| 2016 | 6 | 0.722 | 2.00 | 1.000 | 0.708 |
| Year | N (RW) | Centrist Support (Strict) | Extremity | Right Support | Left Opp. |
|------|--------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------|----------|
| 2016 | 6 | 0.667 | 2.00 | 1.000 | 0.708 |
| 2017 | 0 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| 2018 | 5 | 1.000 | 1.40 | 0.800 | 0.480 |
| 2019 | 195 | 0.410 | 2.14 | 0.838 | 0.746 |
| 2020 | 469 | 0.326 | 2.26 | 0.818 | 0.758 |
| 2021 | 425 | 0.339 | 2.24 | 0.903 | 0.788 |
| 2022 | 446 | 0.404 | 2.16 | 0.891 | 0.820 |
| 2023 | 365 | 0.457 | 2.24 | 0.900 | 0.821 |
| 2024 | 469 | 0.670 | 1.99 | 0.885 | 0.756 |
| 2025 | 455 | 0.597 | 2.25 | 0.895 | 0.799 |
| 2026 | 151 | 0.518 | 2.33 | 0.916 | 0.834 |
| 2019 | 195 | 0.380 | 2.14 | 0.838 | 0.746 |
| 2020 | 469 | 0.300 | 2.26 | 0.818 | 0.758 |
| 2021 | 425 | 0.175 | 2.24 | 0.903 | 0.788 |
| 2022 | 446 | 0.201 | 2.16 | 0.891 | 0.820 |
| 2023 | 365 | 0.255 | 2.24 | 0.900 | 0.821 |
| 2024 | 469 | 0.595 | 1.99 | 0.885 | 0.756 |
| 2025 | 455 | 0.474 | 2.25 | 0.895 | 0.799 |
| 2026 | 151 | 0.334 | 2.33 | 0.916 | 0.834 |
## 2. Pre/Post 2024 Comparison
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ and content extremity for right-wing motions in the Tweede Kamer.
| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen's d |
|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|-----------|
| Centrist Support | 0.384 | 0.618 | +0.234 | +0.68 |
| Centrist Support | 0.251 | 0.507 | +0.256 | +0.65 |
| Extremity | 2.21 | 2.15 | -0.07 | -0.09 |
**Interpretation:** Cohen's d values quantify effect sizes (|d| < 0.2 small, 0.5 medium, > 0.8 large).
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ These are descriptive, not inferential — with only 8 pre-2024 years and 3 post
| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ | Cohen's d | N pre / N post |
|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|-----------|---------------|
| Centrist Support | 0.270 | 0.543 | +0.272 | +0.85 | 1295 / 405 |
| Centrist Support | 0.130 | 0.437 | +0.307 | +0.88 | 1295 / 405 |
| Extremity | 2.28 | 2.18 | -0.10 | -0.14 | 1295 / 405 |
**Interpretation gate:** If opposition metrics also rise post-2024, the shift is not
@@ -67,21 +67,21 @@ Migration = category `asiel/vreemdelingen`. Non-migration = all other categories
| Domain | Pre-2024 Mean CS | Post-2024 Mean CS | Δ CS |
|--------|-----------------|------------------|------|
| Migration | 0.303 | 0.536 | +0.233 |
| Non-migration | 0.529 | 0.605 | +0.076 |
| Migration | 0.146 | 0.361 | +0.215 |
| Non-migration | 0.435 | 0.487 | +0.052 |
## 5. Extremity-Stratified Centrist Support
| Bucket | Period | N | Mean CS | Median CS | P25 | P75 |
|--------|--------|---|---------|-----------|---|-----|
| 1-2 (mild) | Pre-2024 | 221 | 0.522 | 0.400 | 0.250 | 1.000 |
| | Post-2024 | 181 | 0.775 | 1.000 | 0.600 | 1.000 |
| 2-3 (moderate) | Pre-2024 | 1205 | 0.403 | 0.250 | 0.000 | 0.750 |
| | Post-2024 | 640 | 0.606 | 0.600 | 0.250 | 1.000 |
| 3-4 (high) | Pre-2024 | 352 | 0.295 | 0.250 | 0.000 | 0.500 |
| | Post-2024 | 175 | 0.565 | 0.600 | 0.250 | 0.800 |
| 4-5 (extreme) | Pre-2024 | 133 | 0.212 | 0.250 | 0.000 | 0.250 |
| | Post-2024 | 79 | 0.474 | 0.500 | 0.250 | 0.800 |
| 1-2 (mild) | Pre-2024 | 221 | 0.422 | 0.500 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| | Post-2024 | 181 | 0.728 | 1.000 | 0.667 | 1.000 |
| 2-3 (moderate) | Pre-2024 | 1205 | 0.267 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.500 |
| | Post-2024 | 640 | 0.497 | 0.500 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| 3-4 (high) | Pre-2024 | 352 | 0.150 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | Post-2024 | 175 | 0.419 | 0.333 | 0.000 | 0.667 |
| 4-5 (extreme) | Pre-2024 | 133 | 0.091 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | Post-2024 | 79 | 0.275 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.667 |
**Key test:** If centrist support for high-extremity motions (3-5) rose
@@ -91,7 +91,31 @@ If centrist support rose uniformly across all buckets, the shift is about volume
(more motions) rather than tolerance. If only the 1-2 bucket rose, right-wing
parties filed milder motions post-2024 and the 'shift' is illusory.
## 6. Manual Extremity Audit
## 6. Left-wing support for right-wing motions
| Year | N | Mean left_support_mp |
|------|---|---------------------|
| 2016 | 6 | 0.2917 |
| 2018 | 5 | 0.5200 |
| 2019 | 195 | 0.2531 |
| 2020 | 469 | 0.2414 |
| 2021 | 425 | 0.2113 |
| 2022 | 446 | 0.1807 |
| 2023 | 365 | 0.1779 |
| 2024 | 469 | 0.2441 |
| 2025 | 455 | 0.2015 |
| 2026 | 151 | 0.1594 |
| Metric | Pre-2024 Mean | Post-2024 Mean | Δ |
|--------|--------------|---------------|-----|
| Left Support (MP) | 0.2680 | 0.2017 | -0.0663 |
**Interpretation:** Left parties moved from 26.8% to 20.2% support — a 0.1 point shift. Whether this represents leftward Overton expansion depends on whether left parties are tolerating or actively supporting right-wing positions.
![Figure 3: Left-wing party support for right-wing motions](breakpoint_figure_3.png)
## 7. Manual Extremity Audit
**Audit notes:** Perform manual audit by reviewing the motions below. Record agreement per motion. Note whether the LLM score appears driven by *stylistic extremity* (inflammatory phrasing) or *material impact* (substantive rights restriction, institutional change). If agreement < 70%, flag LLM scoring as unreliable for the stratified analysis.
@@ -119,12 +143,12 @@ parties filed milder motions post-2024 and the 'shift' is illusory.
| 20 | 2019 | sociaal/jeugd | 4 | 4-5 (extreme) | | |
## 7. Limitations
## 8. Limitations
- **Small-N time series:** 8 pre-2024 years and at most 3 post-2024 years (2026 is partial).
Effect sizes are descriptive, not confirmatory.
- **LLM extremity scores:** Content-based, not independently validated beyond the
manual audit above. See §6 for agreement rate and noted biases.
manual audit above. See §7 for agreement rate and noted biases.
- **Coalition composition:** Hardcoded per year. 2024 is ambiguous (Rutte IV until July,
Schoof thereafter). Early 2024 motions may be miscoded as Schoof-era.
- **Submitter party identification:** Parsed from motion title prefixes (e.g.,
@@ -133,11 +157,12 @@ parties filed milder motions post-2024 and the 'shift' is illusory.
- **Keyword penetration not analyzed:** The right-wing keyword set was derived
differentially from right-wing motions, making it circular for adoption analysis.
## 8. Figures
## 9. Figures
![Figure 1: Centrist Support Over Time](breakpoint_figure_1.png)
![Figure 2: Extremity Trends and Stratified Centrist Support](breakpoint_figure_2.png)
![Figure 3: Left-wing party support for right-wing motions](breakpoint_figure_3.png)
## 9. Conclusion
## 10. Conclusion
*(Fill in after reviewing all indicators and audit results.)*
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