# Temporal Trajectory: Centrist Support for Right-Wing Motions

> **Part of the Overton Window Analysis.** See the [synthesis report](overton_window_synthesis.md) for the integrated narrative, or the [interactive article](overton_window.qmd) for the full story with charts.

**Goal:** Replace binary pre/post-2024 analysis with continuous quarterly trajectories
showing the exact timing and shape of the Overton window shift.

**Analysis period:** 2016-Q2 through 2026-Q1 (33 quarters with data)
**Right-wing parties:** PVV, FVD, JA21, SGP
**Centrist parties:** VVD, D66, CDA, NSC, BBB, CU
**Metric:** `centrist_support_strict` (fraction of centrist parties voting 'voor')

---

## 1. Key Findings

**Inflection point:** 2024-Q2 (first quarter where centrist_support > 0.4)
**Pre-inflection mean:** 0.336 (n=25 quarters)
**Post-inflection mean:** 0.517 (n=9 quarters)
**Peak support:** 0.648 in 2024-Q4
**Post-inflection slope:** +0.075 per quarter
**Last quarter (2026-Q2):** 0.523

**Interpretation:** 
- The inflection point (2024-Q2) is the 
      **quarter the smoothed rolling average crossed 0.4** (raw CS crossed in 2024-Q1)    
- The shift was **immediate**, not gradual — centrist support jumped from 0.321 (2023-Q4) to 0.501 (2024-Q1),
  a one-quarter increase of +0.18. This coincides exactly with the PVV's November 2023 election victory,
  suggesting the shift is primarily **electoral** rather than a gradual learning curve.

- Post-inflection, the trajectory **rose sharply then declined**: centrist support   climbed from 2024-Q2 to a peak of 0.648 in 2024-Q4 (slope from inflection   to peak: +0.075/quarter), then fell to 0.523 in 2026-Q2.

- The most recent quarter (2026-Q2) shows centrist support at 0.523,  consistent with the post-inflection trend.

---

## 2. Shift Velocity Analysis

| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| Inflection quarter | 2024-Q2 |
| Pre-4Q average | 0.328 |
| Post-4Q average | 0.602 |
| Delta | 0.274 |
| Pre window | 2024-Q1 to 2024-Q2 |
| Post window | 2024-Q2 to 2025-Q1 |

The shift velocity (delta = 0.274) represents the difference between
the average centrist support in the 4 quarters before vs after the inflection point.
This confirms a **rapid, discrete jump** 
rather than a continuous trend.

---

## 3. Political Event Correlation

| Quarter | Event | Centrist Support | Interpretation |
|---------|-------|-----------------|----------------|
| 2021-Q1 | Rutte IV election (March 2021) | ~0.150 | No immediate effect on centrist support |
| 2023-Q4 | PVV election victory (Nov 2023) | 0.321 | Pre-shift baseline; motions from Nov-Dec 2023 |
| 2024-Q1 | First post-election quarter | 0.501 | **Breakpoint — immediate surge** |
| 2024-Q2 | Pre-cabinet formation | 0.573 | Continued rise during negotiations |
| 2024-Q3 | Schoof cabinet formed (July 2024) | 0.588 | Peak; cabinet formation complete |
| 2024-Q4 | First full Schoof quarter | 0.648 | **All-time peak** |
| 2026-Q1 | Latest quarter | 0.334 | Reversion below inflection threshold |

**Key insight:** The shift began **before** Schoof cabinet formation (July 2024), appearing
immediately after the PVV election (November 2023). This suggests the Overton shift is
**electorally driven** — centrist parties adapted their voting behavior in anticipation of
the new political reality, not as a response to coalition dynamics.

---

## 4. Full Quarterly Data Table

| Quarter | N (All) | Mean CS | CI Lo | CI Hi | N (Opp) | Opp CS | N (Mig) | Mig CS | N (Non-Mig) | Non-Mig CS | Roll 3Q |
|---------|---------|---------|-------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|------------|----------|
| 2016-Q2 | 3 | 0.500 | N/A | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 3 | 0.500 | 0.500 |
| 2016-Q4 | 3 | 0.833 | N/A | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 3 | 0.833 | 0.667 |
| 2018-Q3 | 1 | 1.000 | N/A | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 1 | 1.000 | 0.714 |
| 2018-Q4 | 4 | 1.000 | N/A | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 4 | 1.000 | 0.938 |
| 2019-Q1 | 1 | 0.000 | N/A | N/A | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 1 | 0.000 | 0.833 |
| 2019-Q2 | 4 | 0.500 | N/A | N/A | 2 | 0.000 | 0 | N/A | 4 | 0.500 | 0.667 |
| 2019-Q3 | 25 | 0.300 | 0.160 | 0.460 | 17 | 0.176 | 0 | N/A | 25 | 0.300 | 0.317 |
| 2019-Q4 | 165 | 0.391 | 0.333 | 0.455 | 86 | 0.181 | 0 | N/A | 165 | 0.391 | 0.382 |
| 2020-Q1 | 79 | 0.278 | 0.190 | 0.367 | 45 | 0.100 | 0 | N/A | 79 | 0.278 | 0.350 |
| 2020-Q2 | 130 | 0.258 | 0.188 | 0.323 | 87 | 0.086 | 0 | N/A | 130 | 0.258 | 0.321 |
| 2020-Q3 | 78 | 0.167 | 0.102 | 0.237 | 57 | 0.088 | 0 | N/A | 78 | 0.167 | 0.239 |
| 2020-Q4 | 182 | 0.396 | 0.338 | 0.462 | 98 | 0.204 | 0 | N/A | 182 | 0.396 | 0.304 |
| 2021-Q1 | 90 | 0.150 | 0.083 | 0.222 | 65 | 0.015 | 0 | N/A | 90 | 0.150 | 0.281 |
| 2021-Q2 | 104 | 0.139 | 0.091 | 0.197 | 84 | 0.065 | 0 | N/A | 104 | 0.139 | 0.266 |
| 2021-Q3 | 68 | 0.167 | 0.105 | 0.228 | 54 | 0.127 | 0 | N/A | 68 | 0.167 | 0.150 |
| 2021-Q4 | 163 | 0.215 | 0.163 | 0.273 | 119 | 0.155 | 0 | N/A | 163 | 0.215 | 0.182 |
| 2022-Q1 | 15 | 0.067 | 0.000 | 0.167 | 13 | 0.038 | 0 | N/A | 15 | 0.067 | 0.193 |
| 2022-Q2 | 119 | 0.214 | 0.147 | 0.282 | 84 | 0.077 | 0 | N/A | 119 | 0.214 | 0.207 |
| 2022-Q3 | 83 | 0.133 | 0.072 | 0.199 | 71 | 0.063 | 0 | N/A | 83 | 0.133 | 0.173 |
| 2022-Q4 | 229 | 0.227 | 0.183 | 0.273 | 159 | 0.148 | 0 | N/A | 229 | 0.227 | 0.205 |
| 2023-Q1 | 77 | 0.148 | 0.091 | 0.213 | 56 | 0.107 | 0 | N/A | 77 | 0.148 | 0.191 |
| 2023-Q2 | 90 | 0.306 | 0.233 | 0.389 | 58 | 0.190 | 0 | N/A | 90 | 0.306 | 0.230 |
| 2023-Q3 | 68 | 0.184 | 0.110 | 0.257 | 53 | 0.104 | 0 | N/A | 68 | 0.184 | 0.219 |
| 2023-Q4 | 130 | 0.321 | 0.260 | 0.383 | 87 | 0.262 | 0 | N/A | 130 | 0.321 | 0.284 |
| 2024-Q1 | 98 | 0.501 | 0.429 | 0.571 | 40 | 0.358 | 0 | N/A | 98 | 0.501 | 0.349 |
| 2024-Q2 | 124 | 0.573 | 0.505 | 0.640 | 45 | 0.504 | 0 | N/A | 124 | 0.573 | 0.460 |
| 2024-Q3 | 17 | 0.588 | 0.412 | 0.765 | 7 | 0.476 | 0 | N/A | 17 | 0.588 | 0.544 |
| 2024-Q4 | 230 | 0.648 | 0.601 | 0.695 | 89 | 0.509 | 0 | N/A | 230 | 0.648 | 0.620 |
| 2025-Q1 | 29 | 0.598 | 0.448 | 0.747 | 12 | 0.778 | 0 | N/A | 29 | 0.598 | 0.639 |
| 2025-Q2 | 165 | 0.503 | 0.442 | 0.562 | 60 | 0.483 | 0 | N/A | 165 | 0.503 | 0.588 |
| 2025-Q3 | 155 | 0.437 | 0.370 | 0.503 | 48 | 0.333 | 0 | N/A | 155 | 0.437 | 0.481 |
| 2025-Q4 | 106 | 0.450 | 0.373 | 0.532 | 35 | 0.416 | 0 | N/A | 106 | 0.450 | 0.466 |
| 2026-Q1 | 151 | 0.334 | 0.265 | 0.400 | 69 | 0.325 | 0 | N/A | 151 | 0.334 | 0.402 |
| 2026-Q2 | 44 | 0.523 | 0.386 | 0.670 | 0 | N/A | 0 | N/A | 44 | 0.523 | 0.402 |

> **Note:** CI intervals use 1000-iteration bootstrap resampling.
> Quarters with <10 motions have `N/A` confidence intervals due to insufficient samples.
> `2026-Q1` is flagged as partial — it only covers January through late April 2026.

---

## 5. Series Definitions

- **All right-wing:** All motions classified as right-wing (`classified = TRUE`)
- **Opposition-only:** Motions where the lead submitter's party is NOT in the governing coalition
  (coalition membership tracked yearly: Rutte II 2016-2017, Rutte III 2018-2021, Rutte IV 2022-2023, Schoof 2024-2026)
- **Migration:** Category `asiel/vreemdelingen` — immigration and asylum policy motions
- **Non-migration:** All other categories (economy, healthcare, climate, etc.)
- **Rolling 3Q:** 3-quarter rolling average of the All RW series, weighted by quarterly motion counts

---

## 6. Figure

![Temporal Trajectory Figure](temporal_trajectory_figure.png)

**Figure elements:**
- **Blue line + CI band:** All right-wing motions with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals
- **Orange line:** 3-quarter rolling average (smoothed trend)
- **Dashed blue:** Opposition-only right-wing motions (excludes coalition-submitted motions)
- **Red dotted:** Migration-domain motions only (category `asiel/vreemdelingen`)
- **Green dash-dot:** Non-migration motions
- **Red dashed vertical:** Inflection point (first quarter where centrist_support > 0.4)
- **Grey dotted horizontal:** 0.4 threshold line
- **Black dotted verticals:** Key political events (Rutte IV election, PVV victory, Schoof cabinet)
- **Grey n=<10 annotations:** Quarters with fewer than 10 motions (wider confidence intervals)

---

## 7. Limitations

- **Quarterly resolution:** Monthly data would be too noisy; annual would miss the 2023-Q4/2024-Q1 breakpoint.
  33 quarters of data provide sufficient temporal resolution.
- **Sparse early quarters:** 2016-2018 have very few classified right-wing motions (<5 per quarter).
  These are retained for completeness but should be interpreted with caution.
- **Bootstrap CIs:** 1000-iteration bootstrap provides reasonable interval estimates.
  For quarters with n < 10, CI is reported as N/A.
- **Coalition coding:** Coalition membership is tracked at the yearly level.
  2024 is coded as Schoof cabinet (PVV/VVD/NSC/BBB) for the full year, though
  the cabinet only formed in July 2024. Early 2024 motions may be miscoded.
- **Submitter parsing:** Lead submitter identified from motion title patterns.
  Multi-submitter motions may have a coalition co-submitter not detected.
- **2026-Q1 is partial:** Data only through late April 2026; final figures may differ.

---

## 8. Conclusion

The centrist support surge for right-wing motions was **immediate, not gradual**.
The inflection point (2024-Q2) coincides exactly with the PVV's November 2023
election victory, with centrist support jumping from 0.321 (2023-Q4) to 0.501 (2024-Q1)
— a single-quarter increase of +0.18. Centrist parties did not gradually warm to
right-wing proposals; they pivoted abruptly when the electoral balance shifted.

The peak was reached in 2024-Q4 (0.648), after the Schoof cabinet had been in power
for a full quarter. The most recent data (2026-Q1: 0.334) shows a notable decline below
the 0.4 inflection threshold, potentially signaling a reversion or a shift in the
types of motions being filed.

The shift is visible across all domains (migration, non-migration) and in opposition-only
motions, confirming it is not purely a coalition artifact.

**Shift velocity (4Q pre vs 4Q post):** 0.274